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The United States has a long and complicated history
concerning religious rights, and the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. has done little
to clear up the jurisprudence in this field. Although the decision
will doubtless generate a great deal of commentary as a matter
of constitutional and statutory law, the better approach is to
consider whether and to what extent the majority and dissenting
opinions reflect the fundamental principles of religious liberty.
Only in that context can the merits of such a novel decision be
evaluated free from political and other biases.
This Article undertakes precisely that analysis by placing
Hobby Lobby into a wider historical, theoretical, and
international setting so as to determine whether the decision to
grant a commercial corporation a religious accommodation is
consistent with the rationales underlying religious rights. The
discussion considers the work of key theorists in this field while
also contemplating relevant principles of international and
comparative constitutional law. In so doing, the Article seeks to
determine whether the Supreme Court has remained true to
established principles of religious liberty or whether Hobby
Lobby has made the United States an outlier in this important
field of law.
* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.);
J.D., Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of
California, Davis. Portions of this Article are based on "Religious Rights Under the
Religious Precedence Test," which won the Yorke Prize for outstanding doctoral
dissertation at the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law. The author would like to
thank Trevor Allan, Anthony Bradney, Matthew Kramer, Susan Marks, and Stephanie
Palmer for comments, insights, and criticisms on various aspects of this Article. All
errors, of course, remain the author's own.
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HOBBY LOB BY AS A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANOMALY?
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just
bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there
can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising ....
- John Lockel
I. INTRODUCTION
The Founders of the United States were well-versed in political
philosophy and held the work of John Locke in particularly high
esteem, particularly in the field of religious rights.2 Locke's
experience with the violence and deprivation generated by nearly a
century's worth of religious warfare in Europe provided wise counsel
to those charged with creating a workable government for a
religiously pluralist society, and his insights are as relevant today as
they were when they were first written.3
The United States is again in need of such wisdom, given the
controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.4 The case was subject to
extensive commentary before it was heard by the Court,5 and the
1. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (Prometheus Books
1990).
2. See W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE LAW § 2:1 (2013) (discussing Founding period); Saul Cornell, Meaning and
Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History
Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 728 (2013) (describing philosophy
at Founding); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS. EQUALITY (Basic Books 2008); MORTON WHITE,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1978). Debate
exists about the extent to which the Founders, the Framers, and subsequent
authorities intended to or did incorporate various political theories into U.S. law. See
Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 699-700 (2013) (discussing political theory through U.S. history); Andrew C.
Spiropoulos, Tocqueville and the American Amalgam, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103,
104-05 (2013) (describing U.S. political amalgam).
3. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18 (describing approach to religious rights);
Robert Dowd, Religious Diversity and Violent Conflict: Lessons From Nigeria, 38
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153, 153-65 (2014) (discussing catalysts for religious violence
in contemporary society); Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The
Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 25 (2010) (arguing that First
Amendment jurisprudence should remain rooted in tolerance).
4. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5. See Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J. F.
11 (2014) (describing use of Dictionary Act); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraceptive Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 346 (2014) (opposing use of
accommodation in Hobby Lobby); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby,
Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA
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coming months and years will doubtless see a similar onslaught of
debate about issues ranging from the majority's characterization of a
closely held corporation as a "person" for purposes of religious rights
to the proper interpretation and application of the pre-Smith
jurisprudence to matters asserted under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 6 Unfortunately, these
discussions may never provide a truly conclusive answer about the
propriety of the decision, given the novelty of the plaintiffs' claim and
the high degree of politicization surrounding the accommodation in
question. However, there may be another way to assess the
legitimacy of the decision.
For example, it may be useful to consider the historical context
in which religious liberties arose so as to determine whether and to
what extent Hobby Lobby's newly enunciated rule is consistent with
both the purposes of religious rights as well as past practices.7 This
type of methodology is in no way foreign to the five members of the
majority, although they were unusually reticent about discussing
historical issues in Hobby Lobby itself.8 Instead, it was Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenters, who raised the most
Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (supporting plaintiffs' position); Thomas E.
Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul-The Business Entity Law Response to
Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 1 (2014)
(opposing plaintiffs' position); see also John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the
Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 828 (2014) (discussing arguments for
religious rights); Zob Robinson, What is a "Religious Institution"?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181,
184 (2014) (defining religious institutions); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman,
Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 983-84 (2013) (discussing
religious institutionalism); Nelson Tebbe, Associations and the Constitution: Four
Questions About Four Freedoms, 92 N.C. L. REV. 917, 938 (2014) (debating Inazu);
Spencer Churchill, Note, Duty or Dignity? Competing Approaches to the Free Exercise
Rights of For-Profit Corporations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1171, 1172 (2014)
(discussing rights of commercial corporations).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1-4; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1-5; Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2751; Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2015) (suggesting Hobby Lobby is
too vague to conform to the requirements of the rule of law). RFRA and RLUIPA were
said to restore the scope of religious rights in the United States to what they were prior
to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), superseded by statute. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
7. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
8. See id. at 2759. The majority opinion was written by Justice Alito, who was
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas as well as Chief Justice Roberts. See
id. at 2751. All of these men are usually quite fond of arguments based on history and
original intent. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 669-72 (discussing historical arguments on
Supreme Court). However, the majority here relied heavily on the Dictionary Act
without contemplating the broader context of the dispute or the circumstances
generating the underlying legal principles. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769; see
also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's First Era:
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 255 (2010) (noting that
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas are all extremely likely to rely on the Dictionary
Act).
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pressing questions about the history and purpose of religious
liberties.9
Although Justice Ginsburg limited her historical analysis to
Blackstone and early Supreme Court precedent, various
commentators, most notably Michael McConnell, have advocated a
wider historical and jurisprudential analysis of religious rights so as
to take into account the philosophical underpinnings of the nation
and the reliance of both the Founders and the Framers on legal and
political principles enunciated by writers such as John Locke.' 0
Indeed, McConnell has written that "the idea of religious freedom as
our first freedom - both in chronological and logical priority" requires
historical and theoretical analyses that "go far beyond the
deliberations of the First Congress in 1789."11
Other norms, including those that arise as a theoretical,
comparative, and international matter, may also be relevant to the
Hobby Lobby analysis, as suggested by Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion.' 2 Indeed, some commentators have found recent
9. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion referred to Justice Ginsburg's historical analysis only in a passing
footnote. See id. at 2770 n.23.
10. See id. at 2796 n.17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Michael W. McConnell, Why
is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom'?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000)
[hereinafter McConnnell, First Freedom] (advocating a wider analysis); Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1413-14 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins] (describing the
need for a historical approach to this issue); Ethan Bercot, Note, Forgetting to Weight:
The Use of History in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause, 102 GEO. L.J. 845,
848 (2014) (discussing historical arguments in religious rights cases).
11. See McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 10, at 1244.
12. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (placing the
debate in the U.S. constitutional and jurisprudential context). Recent years have seen
an increasing interest in religious rights as a matter of international and comparative
law. See, e.g., NORMAN DOE, LAW AND RELIGION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION (2011) (discussing religious rights in Europe); KRISTINE KALANGES,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN AND IsLAMIc LAW: TOWARD A WORLD LEGAL
TRADITION (2012) (comparing religious rights in different legal systems); Peter G.
Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in International Law
Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 455, 456 (2007-2008) (discussing religious rights
under international law); Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a
Universal Human Right: Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, 2000 BYU L. REV. 217, 224-36 (2002) (describing religious rights in
international context). While this Article does not take a position on the question of
whether and to what extent the United States should or does comply with international
law in the area of religious liberty, it is nevertheless useful to put the U.S. approach
into an international and comparative context. See Alain A. Levasseur, Foreign
Precedents in Constitutional Litigation, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 515, 520-25 (2014)
(advocating internationalist approach to U.S. law); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1230-38 (1999) (discussing
benefits of comparative constitutional law); see also Joint Submission to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee Concerning Religious Freedoms of Indigenous
Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the United States of America, 109th Sess., Oct.
2015] 817
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efforts by the U.S. Supreme Court to place its jurisprudence within
an international and comparative context to be extremely useful in
identifying whether and to what extent certain constitutional rights
"might [be] open for reconsideration . .. based on their disequilibrium
with international values."' 3 A similar type of approach may be
useful here as a means of overcoming certain "blind spots" or biases
regarding these issues.14
The aim of this Article, therefore, is to assess the legitimacy of
the Hobby Lobby decision not through statutory or similar analyses
but instead through detailed consideration of the majority opinion
from a historical, theoretical, international, and comparative
context.15 In so doing, the Article intends to determine whether and
to what extent the majority opinion either falls within currently
established standards involving religious rights or appropriately
extends the scope of religious liberty to include this particular claim.
This latter analysis will be conducted by a review of the various
purposes of religious rights to determine the extent to which the
majority opinion can be said to fulfill one or more or those goals.
The structure of the Article is as follows. The discussion begins
by putting religious rights into historical, international, and
comparative context. This analysis is found in Part III, which begins
by providing a historical overview of the development of religious
rights and the conflicts that those rights were initially intended to
address. This Part then describes the basic parameters of the three
types of religious liberties-nondiscrimination on the basis of religion,
freedom of religious belief, and freedom of religious practice-from a
comparative and international perspective and considers whether and
to what extent the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby meets the
relevant standards.16




Feb. 15, 2015) (discussing U.S. compliance with international human rights
instruments).
13. See Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in
International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (discussing Eighth Amendment
rights). Scholars have promoted comparative constitutional law for precisely this
purpose, including in the area of religious liberties. See RELIGION, RIGHTS, AND
SECULIAR SOCIETY 4-6 (Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis eds., 2014) (advocating a
comparative approach); John Bell, Book Review, Religion, Rights, and Secular Society,
73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 211, 212-13 (2014) (discussing comparative analysis concerning
religious liberties).
14. See Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 553, 579-80 (2007) (noting Vicki Jackson's view that matters of individual
liberties and "those that engender 'deep controversy over internal norms' may be
particularly suitable for comparative constitutional analysis).
15. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
16. See id.
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In undertaking this analysis, consideration is given to the law of
both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, two countries
that share a common legal and historical heritage with the United
States.1 7 Ireland and the United Kingdom are also relevant to this
analysis because they can be legally or culturally characterized as
"Christian nations" to approximately the same extent as the United
States, despite an increasing amount of religious pluralism within
their national borders.' 8
Part III of this Article concludes that the religious
accommodation granted by the majority in Hobby Lobby exceeds the
scope of religious liberty in its currently recognized form and is
therefore presumptively improper.1 9 However, that is not the end of
the discussion, since religious rights can change and evolve over time,
and it is possible that Hobby Lobby simply represents one of these
types of quantum leaps forward.20
The Article therefore moves to a theoretical analysis, beginning
in Part IV, which describes a variety of rationales that have been
used to justify religious rights. The discussion considers five separate
but interrelated concerns, including the desire to promote civil peace,
minimize alienation, further personal autonomy, promote self-
definition, and further the search for truth. This Part also considers
the possibility that religious liberty can and should be supported not
as a matter of theory but simply as a pragmatic arrangement.
Part V contains a similar type of analysis regarding theories
advocating the restriction or elimination of religious rights. Here, the
discussion considers claims that religious liberty violates the
principle of neutrality, benefits religious beliefs over other ethical
beliefs, allows religious persons to become a law unto themselves, and
encourages improper scrutiny of religious beliefs.
Each of the theories presented in Parts IV and V is also
considered in light of the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Hobby Lobby to determine whether and to what extent
17. Ireland and the United Kingdom are both common law countries, like the
United States. However, each jurisdiction has adopted its own unique approach to
religious liberties, as discussed throughout this Article. See S.I. Strong, Christian
Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally Recognized Human Rights and Minimize
the Potential for Violence Within a Society? A Comparative Analysis of American and
Irish Constitutional Law and Their Religious Elements, 29 CASE W. RES. INT'L L.J. 1
passim (1997) (undertaking a detailed comparative analysis of the United States and
Ireland).
18. The extent to which the United States is a "Christian nation" has been
much debated. See Steven K. Green, Understanding the "Christian Nation"Myth, 2010
CARDoZo L. REV. DE NOVO 245, 246-47 (discussing historical understanding of U.S.
religious-legal culture); Michael V. Hernandez, A Flawed Foundation: Christianity's
Loss of Preeminent Influence on American Law, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 626 (2004)
(analyzing religious influences in U.S. law).
19. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
20. See id.
2015] 819
VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW [VOL. 48:813
the individual rationales are reflected in the various opinions.2 1 If the
majority opinion is consistent with one or more of the theories
supporting religious rights, then the decision may be an appropriate
extension of existing legal standards. If, however, those theories align
more closely with the views of the dissent, then the majority may be
said to have gone too far in granting this particular accommodation.
The converse is true with respect to theories supporting the
limitation of religious rights: to the extent that those principles are
reflected in the dissenting opinion, then the majority will be
considered to have exceeded the proper bounds of religious liberty.
This type of methodology eliminates the need to include a
separate section detailing the facts and analysis reflected in Hobby
Lobby.22 Instead, readers are assumed to be generally familiar with
the case and its core holding that a for-profit corporation may claim
exemptions from generally applicable laws, particularly those
relating to the provision of certain contraceptives under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),2 3 on the basis of the
corporation's religious beliefs and practices, as defined by the
religious beliefs and practices of the corporate shareholders. 24
One of the key issues in Hobby Lobby involved the question of
whether a closely held commercial corporation could be considered a
"person" within the context of various statutes involving religious
liberties.2 5 However, questions about who constitutes a "religious
person" for the purpose of a religious accommodation have
traditionally focused on the definition of religion rather than that of
personhood. 26 Although Hobby Lobby does not discuss the definition
of religion (presumably because the faith tradition involved in the
case-Christianity-has been universally considered to be a religion
in the U.S. legal tradition), matters relating to the definition of
religion have affected religious rights analyses in a variety of
important and relevant ways. 2 7
As a result, it is useful to undertake a brief analysis of the
theoretical and practical concerns surrounding the definition of
religion so as to demonstrate why the Supreme Court's conclusions
regarding the personal status of a closely held corporation is so
problematic as a matter of religious liberties law. 28 This discussion
also demonstrates why the decision in Hobby Lobby could have more
21. See generally id.
22. See generally id.
23. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24. See Hobby Lobby, 132 S. Ct. at 2759, 2783.
25. See id. at 2758-59.
26. See id.
27. See id.; Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 363-77 (1994) (discussing difficulties in defining religion).
28. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2793-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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significant ramifications than the majority realized.29 These matters
are taken up in the following Part as a preliminary matter.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION
AND RELIGIOUS PERSONS
A. Theoretical Concerns
Jurists have long struggled with the definition of religion, since
categorizing people or organizations as "religious" not only provides
them with certain legal protections (for example, conscientious
objector status during war time or tax breaks for an organization) but
also imposes burdens on the state by requiring it, for example, to
forgo services or revenues to which it would otherwise be entitled.3 0
The challenge, therefore, is to find "a definition which is sufficiently
narrow (in order to be meaningful) and at the same time broad
enough (in order to avoid the bias against unconventional
religions)."3 ' When expanding the definition of religion, courts and
legislatures must avoid "undermin[ing] the legitimacy of the routine
State regulations in the areas previously (that is to say, before the
definitional extension) held 'secular."' 32
This need for a narrow-yet-broad definition is particularly acute
in the United States due to the conflicting demands of free-exercise
claims (which require a broad definition of religion to accommodate
individual needs) and nonestablishment claims (which require a
narrow definition to avoid improper burdens being placed on
governmental actions).33 The often irreconcilable nature of these
competing demands has led some commentators, including, at one
time, Laurence Tribe, to suggest that courts should use multiple
definitions of religion, depending on the type of claim made. 34
29. See id. at 2783 (considering floodgates arguments); see also id. at 2802-03
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30. See David Little, Studying "Religious Human Rights'" Methodological
Foundations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45, 49-52 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996)
(describing consequences of religious characterization); Wojciech Sadurski, On Legal
Definitions of "Religion," in LAW AND RELIGION 297, 297 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 1992)
(discussing ramifications of characterizing acts as religious); C.G. Hall,
'Aggiornamento": Reflections Upon the Contemporary Legal Concept of Religion, 28
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 7, 10 (1997) (discussing benefits and burdens of acts as defined as
religious).
31. See Sadurski, supra note 30, at 303.
32. See id. at 297-98.
33. See id. at 297 (describing difficulties of U.S. jurisprudence).
34. See Ben Clements, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment: A
Functional Approach, in LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 30, at 310-11 ("Tribe has now
2015] 821
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Experts in ethics and the philosophy of religion can offer little
assistance in this task, since the debate over the definition of religion
is just as active in those fields. Early formulations focused on belief in
a spiritual being or beings before moving to an emphasis on the need
for transcendence.3 5 Sociologist Emile Durkheim brought about a less
content-oriented approach to defining faith by looking primarily at
the functional characteristics of religion rather than specific beliefs
and practices.36
Later movements emphasized the psychological aspect of faith.
For example, a typical psycho-functional definition of religion would
"maintain[] that any system of belief and practice that addressed
humanity's fundamental existential concerns was ipso facto religion,
regardless of the content of those systems." 37 Paul Tillich was among
the most influential of this school of theorists, claiming that
"[r]eligion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate
concern."3 8 Tillich's test eventually found approval in judicial
quarters, most prominently in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Seeger, which involved the grant of conscientious
objector status to persons whose beliefs were broadly "religious,"
though not attached to any particular denomination or formal
creed.3 9
Some scholars claim that the legal test for what constitutes
religion should be subjective and focus primarily on whether the
adherent believes and states that a certain belief pattern is a
religion. 40 Other commentators require an objective element. 41 For
some people, "belief in God or gods as a focus of reverence and
worship is no longer essential," an approach that allows Buddhism,
Taoism, and other non-deist faiths to be considered religions. 42
Indeed, some scholars claim that a belief system no longer needs to
deal comprehensively with "all the inexorable questions relating to
rejected the dual approach . . . ."). Multiple definitions of religion can raise suspicions of
arbitrariness as well as the potential for discrimination.
35. See Brian C. Wilson, From the Lexical to the Polythetic: A Brief History of
the Definition of Religion, in WHAT IS RELIGION?, in ORIGINS, DEFINITIONS, AND
EXPLANATIONS 141, 144-48 (Thomas A. Idinopulos & Brian C. Wilson eds., 1998)
(describing history of definition of religion).
36. See id. at 151 (discussing Durkheim).
37. See id.
38. See PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 7-8 (1959); see also Wilson,
supra note 35, at 153 (discussing Tillich). For a discussion of the potentially startling
consequences of this definition, see Timothy Macklem, Reason and Religion, in FAITH
IN LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 69, 77 (Peter Oliver et al. eds., 2000).
39. See 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965); Hall, supra note 30, at 25 (discussing
conscientious objectors).
40. See Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the
Law, in LAw AND RELIGION, supra note 30, at 67, 78 (describing subjective test for
religion).
41. See Hall, supra note 30, at 11 (discussing objective test for religion).
42. See id. at 14, 30-32.
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man's existence and place in the universe," but merely with some of
those issues.4 3
This latter approach has been criticized by a number of
commentators, including Bette Evans, who notes that
[i]f religion is defined by the function of the belief system rather than
by its content, then any ultimate system of values should qualify for
[legal] protection. By this characterization, one whose ultimate set of
personal values is music, football, or the Democratic party might well
have a legitimate religious claim.4 4
However, Evans's conclusion erroneously appears to equate intensity
of sentiment with the function of the belief system. Indeed, her
criticism would appear more apt if it were of the psychological, rather
than functional, approach to religion.45
Nontheism and atheism involve slightly different issues. John
Locke advocated discrimination against atheists because they were
seen as less trustworthy and more likely to bring about civil disorder
than religious believers. 46 Michael McConnell believes that granting
atheists conscientious objector status makes little sense, since
"unbelief entails no obligations and no observances .... [B]elief in the
nonexistence of God does not in itself generate a moral code." 4 7
However, Douglas Laycock believes it inappropriate to delve into the
substance of different religious beliefs and would instead protect
nontheism by virtue of its being related to the types of beliefs that are
traditionally held to be religious. 48 Laycock also believes that
transcendence for the nontheist may be found in natural law or
principles of equality.49
These theoretical discussions are extremely illuminating when
considered in the context of the debate about the status of closely held
corporations in Hobby Lobby.5 0 For example, any court or
commentator who takes the view that the definition of religion is to
be defined through subjective or functional means will likely conclude
that a corporation-which cannot think or act for itself-cannot be
"religious" and therefore cannot be a religious person in need of legal
43. See id. at 11.
44. Bette Novit Evans, Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment
Religion Clauses: Having It Both Ways, 30 J. CHURCH & STATE 463, 469 (1988); see also
Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
659-60 n.35 (1990) (criticizing broad definition of religion).
45. See Macklem, supra note 38, at 81 (concluding the psychological approach
to religious freedom is "undernourished").
46. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 64 (opposing religious rights for atheists).
47. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty As Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 334 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty] (quoting Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-11).
48. See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 47, at 335 (advocating functional
approach to religious rights).
49. See id. at 336 (justifying functional approach to religious rights).
50. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
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protection.5 1 Those who define religion through objective factors, such
as the verbal assertion of a particular credo, will probably take the
opposite view.52 Indeed, this distinction appears to be implicit in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby.53
Theoretical difficulties relating to the definition of religion are
exacerbated in Hobby Lobby as a result of the request to extend the
religious beliefs of the shareholders to the corporation itself.54 While
the propriety of this move can be analyzed as a matter of corporate
law,5 5 the more intriguing and perhaps more fundamental question is
whether and to what extent the attribution of the shareholders' belief
system to the corporation works under the law relating to religious
liberties. In addition to problems relating to the manner in which
religion is defined (i.e., as an objective or subjective, functional, or
psychosocial matter), concerns arise with respect to the means of
ascertaining the content of the religious claim of a corporation.
This issue has not been discussed with any frequency, since most
courts and commentators have assumed that the holder of the beliefs
in question is the same person who is asserting the religious claim. 56
The dissent in Hobby Lobby notes that defining religious beliefs by
reference to the owners of a business entity would appear to give rise
51. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]orporations have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure
and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their 'personhood' often
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of 'We the People'
by whom and for whom our Constitution was established."); see also Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority makes much of the claim that
"[w]hen rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people," meaning the shareholders, officers, and
employees. See id. at 2768. However, the majority does not discuss the effect of its
ruling on the religious or other rights of the employees, while the dissent does. See id.
at 2791 ("[W]ith respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech claims, '[y]our
right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins."' (citations
omitted)). Furthermore, the majority fails to take into account the fact that other legal
persons have been denied status as a person under the U.S. Constitution. See
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (suggesting that a foreign state may
not be a person within the meaning of the due process provisions of the U.S.
Constitution); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (noting that
a U.S. state is not a person under the U.S. Constitution).
52. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66 (citing plaintiff corporations'
mission statements). Of course, a verbal assertion, without more, is insufficient to
establish a religious right. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting need for
substantive analysis).
53. See id. at 2764-66 (focusing on objective elements); id. at 2794 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (focusing on subjective elements).
54. See id. at 2768-75.
55. See id. at 2794-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Tamara R. Piety, Against
Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2626 (2008) (noting
commercial shareholders are deemed to have no religious perspective); Rutledge, supra
note 5, at 24-40.
56. One known exception exists. See Quinn's Supermarket v. Att'y Gen., [1972]
I.R. 1 (Ir.); see also infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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to few, if any, theoretical issues in cases involving sole
proprietorships and religious organizations, given the close identity
between the legal and natural persons involved.5 7 However,
commercial corporations, even those that are closely held, give rise to
different and potentially significant issues, since those organizations
are not created to fulfil a religious purpose and involve a number of
persons who may or may not share the same religious perspectives.5 8
Although the majority in Hobby Lobby attempts to sidestep the issue
as merely a practical concern, citing the availability of corporate
voting mechanisms and state law, religious rights were never
intended to be available to persons whose commitment to a particular
religious belief or practice only exists with a 51 percent degree of
certainty. 59 Thus, Justice Ginsburg appears to have the better
understanding of religious liberties with respect to this issue.60
The majority in Hobby Lobby also fails to consider how the
religious rights of the dissenting shareholders would be affected by a
rule allowing a commercial corporation to adopt certain religious
beliefs by majority rule.6 ' Although one solution might be to require
consensus before a religious right could be asserted on the part of a
corporate entity, that method provides little relief as a theoretical
matter, since there will still be situations where some shareholders'
desire to assert a religious claim may be thwarted by other
shareholders. While freedom of religious practice is often
circumscribed by reference to the rights of others, the "others" in
question have not traditionally been defined as constituent members
of the religion in question.6 2 Furthermore, freedom of religious belief
(which is what is primarily at issue in questions relating to the
definition of religion) is not subject to third-party concerns.6 3 Given
these jurisprudential paradoxes, the majority rule in Hobby Lobby
seems ill-advised. 64
B. Practical Concerns
The theoretical debate about the definition of religion has certain
practical implications for national and international legal systems
which must identify, with some degree of clarity, which persons are
57. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 2797 n. 19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 2774-75. Although this issue could be determined as a question of
sincerity of belief, that is a practical rather than theoretical solution. See infra notes
88-110 and accompanying text.
60. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 2774-75; see also infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text
(concerning third parties' religious rights).
62. See infra notes 219-36 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
64. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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eligible for protection under the law.6 5 As a result of the underlying
theoretical issues, most international organizations, including the
United Nations, the European Commission of Human Rights
(European Commission), and the European Court of Human Rights
(European Court), avoid defining the term religion whenever
possible. 66
Despite these difficulties, a few useful standards exist. One of
the most helpful comes from the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which has construed Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),67 one of the core
documents of the international human rights canon, as
protect[ing] theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the
right not to profess any religion or belief. Article 18 is not limited in its
application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with
institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of
traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any
tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons,
including the fact they are newly established, or represent minorities
that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious
community. 6 8
Another fundamental human rights instrument, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration), is also
considered to embrace a broad definition of religion.69 However, that
document does not provide protection for beliefs of a nonreligious
character, such as "political, cultural, scientific, or economic [beliefs],
65. The following discussion refers to a number of instruments that the United
States has not signed or ratified. However, the standards contained in these documents
are relevant to this discussion to the extent they demonstrate the existence (or not) of
an international consensus regarding the definition of religion.
66. See Peter Cumper, The Protection of Religious Rights Under Section 13 of
the Human Rights Act 1998, [2000] PUBLIC LAW 54, 261 [hereinafter Cumper, Section
13] (discussing international approach to defining religion); Natan Lerner, Religious
Human Rights Under the United Nations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 79, 131 [hereinafter Lerner,
Religious Human Rights] (describing international organizations' method of defining
religion).
67. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR. See
ICCPR, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 717, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976,
and ratified by the United States June 8, 1992).
68. Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights
Committee under Article 40, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 4, (Sept. 27, 1993). In adopting
this definition, the Human Rights Committee appears to recognize both positive (right
to believe) and negative (right not to believe) aspects of religion. See id.; Little, supra
note 30, at 50 (discussing positive and negative religious rights).
69. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. GAOR, 2d Special Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 72,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; see also Lerner, Religious
Human Rights, supra note 66, at 131. The United States has signed and ratified the
Universal Declaration. See Universal Declaration, supra.
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all of which are entitled to protection according to law but do not
belong to the sphere normally described as religion."70
National legal systems find it equally difficult to define religion.
For example, the United Kingdom does not have a single statutory or
common law definition of religion and instead handles the matter
piecemeal through legislation such as the Charities Act 199371 and
the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855.72 In many ways, this
approach is similar to that advocated at one time in the United States
by Laurence Tribe, although the technique appears to have been
adopted because of certain practical concerns relating to the absence
of a written constitution in the United Kingdom rather than as a
theoretical preference. 73
Questions relating to the definition of religion have arisen from
time to time in the United Kingdom but were addressed most recently
in late 2013, in R v. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and
Marriages, which held that "a place of meeting for religious worship"
under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 included a chapel
of the Church of Scientology. 74 In that case, the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom 75 held that
[t]here has never been a universal legal definition of religion in English
law, and experience across the common law world over many years has
shown the pitfalls of attempting to attach a narrowly circumscribed
meaning to the word. There are several reasons for this: the different
contexts in which the issue may arise, the variety of world religions,
developments of new religions and religious practices, and
developments in the common understanding of the concept of religion
due to cultural changes in society. While the historical origins of the
70. See Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 131.
71. See Charities Act, 1993, c. 10 (U.K.) (involving questions of whether an
entity operates for the advancement of religion); see also Barralet v. Att'y-Gen. [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1565 (Eng.) (concerning predecessor statutes).
72. See Places of Worship Registration Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 81, § 2 (Eng.)
(requiring registration of "place[s] of meeting for religious worship," at which time
certain benefits may accrue); see also R v. Registrar Gen., ex parte Segerdal, [1970] 2
Q.B. 697 (Eng.) (discussing the Places of Worship Registration Act).
73. See CATHERINE ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 2
(2013-2014); Sadurski, supra note 30, at 311 ("Tribe has now rejected the dual
approach. . . ."); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. Although the United
Kingdom does not have a written constitution, several documents, ranging from the
Magna Carta of 1215 to the Human Rights Act 1998, are sometimes considered
constitutional in nature. See David Feldman, The Nature and Significance of
"Constitutional" Legislation, 129 L.Q.R. 343, 347 (2013) (discussing constitutional
legislation in the United Kingdom).
74. See R. v. Registrar Gen. of Births, Deaths and Marriages, [2013] UKSC 77
[65] (appeal taken from Eng.) (Toulson, J.S.C.); see also Places of Worship Registration
Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 81, § 2 (Eng.).
75. In 2009, the United Kingdom created a new national Supreme Court, which
took over the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which had previously been the
highest court in the land. See Supreme Court, http://supremecourt.uk (last visited Mar.
22, 2015); see also Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 23 (Eng.) (creating supreme
court).
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legislation are relevant to understanding its purpose, the expression
"place of meeting for religious worship" in section 2 of the [Places of
Worship Registration Act] has to be interpreted in accordance with
contemporary understanding of religion and not by reference to the
culture of 1855. It is no good considering whether the members of the
legislature over 150 years ago would have considered Scientology to be
a religion because it did not exist.7 6
Irish courts have also had occasion to consider the definition of
religion, which might presumably be affected by the distinctly
Christian nature of the Irish Constitution." However, Irish courts
and legislators have not limited the definition of religion to the
Christian faith and have instead extended protection to polytheistic
and nontheistic faith traditions as well as atheism.7 8
Although most commentators view the Irish approach as
unproblematic from a theoretical perspective, the statutory definition
of religion in Ireland is narrower than it is in parts of the United
Kingdom, including Northern Ireland.7 9 This distinction could create
some practical difficulties in cross-border matters.8 0
76. R v. Registrar Gen. of Births, Deaths, and Marriages, [2013] UKSC 77, [34]
(Toulson, J.S.C.).
77. Pro-Christian language is found in article 44(1), which indicates that "[t]he
State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall
hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion." Ir. Const., 1937,
art. 44(1). Although the Constitution Review Group recommended in 1996 that Article
44.1 be deleted because it could "give rise to misunderstandings and cause needless
offence to . . . religious minorities and non-believers," that recommendation has not yet
been implemented. Constitution Review Group, Report 357 (1996), available at
https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Constitutional%20Review%20Group%201996.p
df. Potentially problematic language is also found in the preamble, which states
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
We, the people of Eire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ,
Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl.
78. See Corway v. Indep. Newspapers Ltd [1999] 4 I.R. 484, 502-03 (Ir.)
(Barrington, J.) (extending definition of religion); McGee v. Att'y Gen. [1974] I.R. 284,
316-17 (Ir.) (Walsh, J.) (expanding concept of religious liberties); J.M. KELLY, THE
IRISH CONSTITUTION 1098-99 (Gerard Hogan & Gerry Whyte eds., 1993) (discussing
development of religious liberty in Ireland). However, Ireland does require the
president and judiciary to take oaths demonstrating some kind of religious belief. See
IR. CONST., 1937, arts. 12(8), 34(5)(1).
79. See Oonagh B. Breen, Different Paths, Same Destination: Emerging Issues
for Northern Ireland Charities Operating in the Republic of Ireland, 50 IRISH JURIST
70, 93, 97 (2013) (identifying differences in English and Irish statutory regimes); see
also FRANCIS X. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND: AN
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 161 (1997) (discussing Irish legal principles relating to
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Extensive litigation about First Amendment concerns has
resulted in a complicated and sometimes conflicting jurisprudence
regarding the legal definition of religion in the United States.8 1 One
time-tested formulation was identified in United States v. Seeger and
holds that religion is "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
God."8 2 Although this statement was generated by a case that
involved a federal statute rather than the U.S. Constitution, this
concept is often considered to approximate the constitutional
standard in the United States, although that point is debated to this
day.8 3
In determining whether the appropriate standard has been met,
U.S. courts investigate whether the beliefs are sincerely held and
"based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."84 This
approach has consistently been held to grant nonreligious belief
systems, such as atheism, the same protections that are afforded to
positive religions on the grounds that "the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."85 While
this may come very close to protecting "merely" ethical beliefs, U.S.
courts have claimed the ability to distinguish between the two.86
The Seeger approach has the advantage of lessening the risk of
discrimination against nontraditional faiths, since it is a functional,
rather than content-oriented, approach.8 7 It also appears consistent
religion); JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 558 (1992) (describing Irish
law concerning religion).
80. See Breen, supra note 79, at 93, 97 (identifying problems with disconnect
between English and Irish law).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, in LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 30, at 337-39 (discussing U.S. First
Amendment jurisprudence); Feofanov, supra note 27, at 319 (discussing religious rights
in the United States); Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 493, 520-23 (2012) (discussing recent U.S. jurisprudence); Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2010) (analyzing
problems of First Amendment law); John Sexton, Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1064 (1978) (proposing a definition of
religion). Some U.S. commentators attempt to differentiate between freedom of religion
and freedom of conscience. See Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and
Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (comparing constituent elements of religion
and belief).
82. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
83. See id.; Murray, supra note 81, at 520-23 (discussing Seeger test); Sexton,
supra note 81, at 1064 (noting importance of Seeger test); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970).
84. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175; see also Hall, supra note 30, at 25-26 (discussing
U.S. courts generally).
85. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985).
86. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44 (granting conscientious objector status to
those opposed to war on moral, ethical, or religious beliefs).
87. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175-76.
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with the standards enunciated under international law and in other
national systems.8 8 However, the Seeger test also includes certain
subjective elements, such as sincerity.8 9 While this feature was
initially adopted to avoid the possibility that any belief can be
categorized as religious merely on the speaker's whim,90 it is
somewhat problematic in contexts such as Hobby Lobby, which
involve a non-natural person.9 1
Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, the majority in Hobby Lobby
sidestepped the sincerity requirement, suggesting that such an
analysis would require a determination about the reasonableness or
truth of the underlying religious claims.9 2 However, Justice Ginsburg
noted that
[religious] beliefs, however deeply held, do not suffice to sustain a
RFRA claim. RFRA, properly understood, distinguishes between
"factual allegations that [plaintiffs'] beliefs are sincere and of a
religious nature," which a court must accept as true, and the "legal
conclusion . . . that [plaintiffs'] religious exercise is substantially
burdened," an inquiry the court must undertake.9 3
It is unclear whether the majority's disinclination to evaluate the
sincerity of the corporations' religious beliefs was based on theoretical
or practical concerns.94 However, both those objections would appear
to be met by evaluating the religious sincerity of a religious entity (as
opposed to its owners or shareholders) by considering the form taken
by the organization."5 Such an approach would also comply with the
issues identified by Seeger, namely the possibility that a party could
use religion to mask an objection that was based on other political or
moral grounds.9 6
88. See Meese & Oman, supra note 5, at 289 (discussing Seeger test in
international and comparative context); supra notes 30-64 and accompanying text.
89. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175-76; Hall, supra note 30, at 28-30.
90. See Hall, supra note 30, at 27-30; Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 954-57
(1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Where Rights Begin] (noting pros and cons of a sincerity
element).
91. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
92. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778, 2798 n.21; Ronald J. Colombo, The
Naked Private Square, 51 HOuS. L. REV. 1, 64 (2013) (discussing sincerity element in
religious rights analysis).
93. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 2778.
95. See id. at 2795-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 57-60
and accompanying text (regarding distinctions between natural persons, sole
proprietorships, and religious organizations, on the one hand, and commercial entities,
on the other).
96. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175-76; Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90,
at 954-57 (discussing strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to religious
rights).
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Reliance on the form adopted by the organization in question
would not only make sense as a means of overcoming theoretical
issues relating to whether the claim in question could be considered
religious,9 7 it would also provide key insights into the sincerity
element. For example, commercial corporations enjoy several benefits
not available to religious nonprofits, such as the ability to engage in
lobbying efforts and campaign for political candidates that support
particular positions, be they religious or political.9 8 Perhaps even
more importantly, commercial incorporation allows individual
shareholders to escape personal liability for the acts of the
corporation. 9 These benefits lead Justice Ginsburg to "ask why the
separation [between shareholders and the corporation] should hold
only when it serves the interest of those who control the corporation,"
but perhaps the better question is whether the benefits accruing to
commercial organizations suggest a lower degree of religious sincerity
than exists with respect to religious nonprofits. 00 Indeed, that higher
level of dedication to noncommercial concerns is precisely what
motivates legislatures to provide religious organizations with
exemptions from certain generally applicable laws, such as those
relating to the standards of employment or payment of taxes.10 '
A similar type of distinction is evident in the law and theory
regarding sincerity in natural persons. For example, Anthony
Bradney defines religious persons as "obdurate believers," meaning
individuals "who do not see their religion as being private or
peripheral." 102 Bradney highlights the "unyielding nature of [these
believers'] faith," which distinguishes it from the relatively low level
of religious dedication demonstrated by others in society. 03
This distinction would also appear relevant to the discussion
about the religious rights of commercial corporations, including those
that are closely held. For example, although the controlling
shareholders of a commercial corporation may have some religious,
ethical, or philosophical beliefs that they wish to be reflected in their
business dealings, the decision to incorporate as a commercial
corporation suggests that various other motivations also exist.1 04
Religious nonprofits, on the other hand, reflect the kind of higher
97. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
98. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
99. See id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 2795-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also I.R.S. Publication
557 29 (Rev. Oct. 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflp557.pdf (noting
sincerity of belief of the religious organization is critical to the organization's obtaining
tax-exempt status).
102. Anthony Bradney, Faced by Faith, in FAITH IN LAW: EssAYS IN LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 38, at 89, 90 [hereinafter Bradney, Faced by Faith].
103. See id.
104. See Ralph Nader, Legislating Corporate Ethics, 30 J. LEGIS. 193, 197 (2004)
(discussing the Social Venture Network); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
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dedication that is evident in Bradney's "obdurate believers," since the
primary, if not exclusive, purpose behind the creation of those
organizations is to further the religious beliefs and facilitate the
religious practices of the shareholders.105 Thus, analyses based on the
use of the different corporate forms can be used to mirror the
longstanding jurisprudence regarding the availability of religious
exemptions for natural persons.
Focusing on the corporate form also provides a useful and
coherent answer to some of the other issues raised in Hobby Lobby,
including those that involve economic concerns.1 0 6 For example,
''many economists are distrustful of merely verbalized preferences
and insist instead on revealed preferences - preferences that people
are willing to vindicate by giving up something in return."10 7
Applying this methodology to the facts in Hobby Lobby would not only
provide a clear and easily identifiable rule for lower courts to follow,
it would be consistent with longstanding law and practice in the area
of religious rights.1 08 For example, Michael McConnell has noted that
religious "accommodations are designed to alleviate a burden, not to
bestow a benefit."10 9 Thus, in a number of cases, the state imposes a
commensurate cost on the person asserting his or her religious rights,
such as requiring conscientious objectors to military duty to
undertake alternative forms of public service. 110
The final practical implication that must be considered involves
the way in which the broad definition of religion under U.S. law
interacts with the facts in Hobby Lobby."'1 Justice Ginsburg
suggested that the decision in Hobby Lobby can and likely will open
the door to numerous other types of lawsuits, an observation that
105. See Bradney, Faced by Faith, supra note 102, at 90. Notably, religious
nonprofits can receive protection for religiously motivated actions even if those actions
do not fall within the standard definition of a religious practice. This is a key way for
legal systems to provide protection for religiously motivated acts without having to
undertake more detailed inquiries into the centrality or sincerity of the acts in
question.
106. The majority relied heavily on the claim that the refusal of a religious
exemption would place a significant economic burden on the plaintiff corporations and,
by extension, their shareholders. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. However, the
majority appears to have inflated the amount of economic harm by refusing to offset
the amount of the penalties by the savings associated with lower insurance premiums,
despite the fact that some experts suggested that the savings would have been
extensive and might even have offset the amount of the penalties in their entirety. See
id. at 2759, 2776.
107. Louis Michael Seidman, Political and Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1257, 1266 (2013).
108. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 735 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell,
Accommodation]; see also Seidman, supra note 107, at 1266-67 (discussing purpose of
religious rights).
110. See Seidman, supra note 107, at 1266-67.
111. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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appeared prophetic given that the Supreme Court relied on Hobby
Lobby only days after it was issued to grant an extremely rare
emergency injunction to a liberal arts college making a similar type of
claim." 2 Indeed, the majority appears to have created a floodgate
scenario that will be difficult for lower courts to address.x1 3
This discussion describes some of the reasons why the decision in
Hobby Lobby is so problematic as a matter of religious rights.114
However, this analysis has focused only on preliminary issues
relating to the definition of religion. It is also necessary to consider
how Hobby Lobby measures up to yarious core questions about
religious liberty." 5 Those matters are addressed in the following
Parts.
III. RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL, THEORETICAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The preceding discussion regarding the definition of religion
suggests that the majority in Hobby Lobby would have been well
served by a more thorough historical understanding of the nature and
function of religious rights.11 6 However, it is also necessary to
consider religious liberties in light of contemporary circumstances, as
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has noted.117
As anyone who reads the newspapers knows, religio-political
conflict is an issue all over the world. Martha Nussbaum has
suggested that recent events have generated a climate of fear
regarding the possibility of religiously motivated violence and
resulted in an increase in religious intolerance in the United States
and elsewhere." 8 Certainly it is true that the world has seen some
high-profile acts of religious violence, which has led to a number of
restrictions on religious beliefs and practices, particularly those that
112. See id. at 2802-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Wheaton College v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
113. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that the majority decision provides "[niot much help ... for the lower courts bound by
today's decision").
114. See generally id.
115. See generally id.
116. See id. at 2795-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. See R v. Registrar Gen. of Births, Deaths and Marriages, [2013] UKSC 77
[35] (Toulson, J.S.C.).
118. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE:
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 13 (Harvard Univ. Press 2012)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, INTOLERANCE] (discussing tenor of contemporary religious
rights analyses).
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are associated with the faith tradition (Islam) that is most popularly
believed to be associated with religious violence." 9
Unfortunately, many of these measures have failed to learn from
history and therefore fail to take into account the likelihood that the
restrictive measures in question will themselves lead to religious
conflict.1 20 Furthermore, many of those who would limit certain types
of religious persons, beliefs, or practices seem unaware of the fact
that virtually all faith groups-including Christianity-are capable of
religious violence.121
Originally, religious rights were established as a means of
minimizing the likelihood of religious violence, particularly violence
at the hands of disgruntled religious minorities.12 2 Over time, the
theoretical justification for religious liberty has changed in a number
of key regards. 23 Other important shifts have also taken place,
including with respect to the definition of religious majorities and
religious minorities.
At this point, the characterization of a particular person or group
as a religious minority appears to be very much in the eye of the
119. See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text. For example, countries as
diverse as France and the United States have prohibited religious persons from
wearing certain types of clothing, most notably burkas and hijabs. See NUSSBAUM,
INTOLERANCE, supra note 118, at 104-11 (discussing religious clothing issues in the
United States); loanna Tourkochoriti, The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to
Freedom of Religion in France and the United States, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791,
848 (2012) (noting that burka bans may lead to violence in the future); Brian M.
Murray, Note, Confronting Religion: Veiled Muslim Witnesses and the Confrontation
Clause, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1737-40 (2010) (discussing religious garb under
U.S. law); S.I. Strong, Muslim Veils Aren't a Hindrance to Court Proceedings,
EXAMINER (D.C.) (Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Strong, Veils] (discussing religious
clothing of witnesses and parties). The United Kingdom has also been struggling with
issues regarding religious dress. See NUSSBAUM, INTOLERANCE, supra note 118, at 104
(discussing British law concerning religious clothing). See generally Eoin Daly,
Restrictions on Religious Dress in French Republican Thought: Returning the Secularist
Justification to a Rights-Based Rationale, 30 DUBLIN U. L.J. 154 (2008) (identifying
religious clothing issues in contemporary Britain).
120. See Tourkochoriti, supra note 119, at 848 (describing connections between
religious rights and religious conflict).
121. Indeed, historians have long noted that "[o]f all the great world religions
past and present, Christianity has been by far the most intolerant." PEREZ ZAGORIN,
HOW THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE WEST 1 (2003), as quoted in
Gordon A. Christenson, "Liberty and the Exercise of Religion" in the Peace of
Westphalia, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 721, 722 (2013).
122. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18 (justifying religious rights as means of
keeping the civil peace).
123. See infra notes 270-393 and accompanying text. For example, religious
liberties are now sometimes viewed as providing the means by which a religious
majority or a significantly sized religious minority can impose its worldview on others.
See Dowd, supra note 3, at 154 (discussing Nigeria); John Rawls, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 798-99 (1997) ("Forceful resistance is
unreasonable: it would mean attempting to impose by force their own comprehensive
doctrine that a majority of other citizens who follow public reason, not unreasonably,
do not accept.").
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beholder. For example, while the shareholders in Hobby Lobby may
view themselves as a beleaguered religious minority living in a world
that fails to reflect or respect their religious principles, members of
other faiths tend to see the shareholders as members of a privileged
religious majority seeking an even broader scope of protection for
their religious beliefs and practices.1 24 Indeed, members of other
religious traditions often find their religious beliefs and practices
burdened in far more direct ways than payment of insurance
premiums for a type of medical treatment that may never be sought
by a third-party employee.' 2 5
Traditionally, religious rights focused on concerns about actual
violence. While the United States has not usually experienced that
particular type of religious conflict, there are those whose language
appears to promote such measures. Thus, statements by Louisiana
Governor Bobby Jindal, a self-proclaimed "evangelical Catholic," that
members of the Democratic Party are "waging wars against religious
liberty and education and . . . that a rebellion is brewing in the U.S.
with people ready for 'a hostile takeover' of the nation's capital," could
be seen as more than a rhetorical call to arms, particularly given
various types of religious revolutions seen elsewhere in the world.1 26
Friction between religious people and those of another (or no)
faith may injure individuals or society even if violence is not
immediately threatened. For example, a party may experience
various types of emotional or psychological harm as a result of others'
religious practices.1 27
124. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66 (2014); see also T. Jeremy Gunn,
But This is Our Country: Religion, Identity, and the Culture Wars, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 1-3 (2006) (discussing issues of self-perception).
125 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Submission to the
U.N., supra note 12, at 9-11 (discussing burdens on Native Americans); Strong, Veils,
supra note 119 (discussing burdens on religious minorities in U.S. courts); Sami Hasan,
Comment, Veiling Religion in the Force: The Validity of "Religion-Neutral Appearance"
as an Employer Interest, 9 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 87, 89 (2009-2010) (regarding
burdens on various religious minorities). Members of certain minority faiths, such as
Judaism and Islam, also find themselves the victims of hate crimes. See SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF, RAPPORTEUR'S DIGEST ON FREEDOM
OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 87 (2011) (containing excerpts of reports presented to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights from 1986 to 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/RapporteursDigestFreedomReligionB
elief.pdf.
126. Tom Hamburger, Bobby Jindal, Raised Hindu, Uses Christian Conversion
to Woo GOP for 2016 Run, WASH. POST (May 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/bobby-jindal-raised-hindu-uses-christian-conversion-to-woo-gop-base-for-2016-
run/2014105/12/c446fa34-d989-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html [http://perma.ccN7DZ-
PGRZ] (archived Feb. 22, 2015); Connor Radnovich, Jindal: People Ready for "Hostile
Takeover" of DC, TPM NEWS (June 22, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
news/jindal-hostile-takeover [http://perma.cc/7CVN-G8VD] (archived Feb. 22, 2015).
127. See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Shubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.
2008) (involving various tort claims against former pastor); William Drabble, Note,
Righteous Torts: Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Shubert and the Free Exercise
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All of these examples suggest that "the question of how to square
religious liberty with the public good" is as important today as it was
in the time of Locke's time.1 2 8 However, as shall be seen, the way in
which these religious issues now arise may differ from the classic or
historical model.
A. The Historic Importance of Religious Rights
The debate concerning the proper relationship between the state
and religion has ancient roots, with demands for freedom of belief
"preced[ing] every other in the history of the struggle for human
rights and fundamental freedoms."1 29 International protection of
religious groups dates back at least to "the signing of the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648, which modified the rule of cuius regio eius religio
and started to pay attention to religious rights." 3 0 Following World
War I, international protection for religious rights focused on the
group aspects of the right, although that trend was reversed after the
collapse of the League of Nations and the horrors of World War II,
when the new international order began to emphasize individual,
rather than group, rights.' 3 '
Protection for religious rights also exists as a matter of domestic
law. However, the shape and scope of national laws on religious
liberty have varied depending on the political stability of the
jurisdiction in question, the historical relationship between church
and state in that legal system, and the amount of religious pluralism
within each society. 132 Nevertheless, comparative studies suggest
that it is possible to identify a modern understanding of religious
rights that is broadly consistent across national boundaries.
Defense in Texas, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 275-77 (2010) (discussing religious rights
defense to torts). English courts recently sidestepped the need to balance the religious
rights of a religious Hindu who sought to be cremated on a funeral pyre against offense
to the sensibilities of the public. See R. (Ghai) v. Newcastle City Council [2010] EWCA
Civ. 59 [39], [2011] Q.B. 591 (Eng.) (deciding the matter on statutory grounds); see also
Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis, Last Rites and Human Rights: Funeral Pyres and
Religious Freedom in the United Kingdom, 12 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 131, 151 (2010)
(noting the argument for protection was stronger under statutory law than
international human rights law).
128. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2004); see also LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing
tension between religious and secular groups).
129. See PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 324
(1983); see also Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 83.
130. See Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 83.
131. See id. at 84-85 (discussing history of religious rights).
132. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 1, 2 (analyzing basis for religious rights); Lerner,
Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 82-86 (discussing historical approach to
religious rights).
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B. Current Approaches to Religious Rights-Constituent Elements
The contemporary understanding of religious liberties
differentiates between three basic principles: (1) freedom of religious
belief, which is generally considered absolute; (2) freedom of religious
practice, which is subject to a variety of limitations primarily based
on public welfare, morality, and the rights of others and can, in some
instances, be limited to specific practices directly related to religion
(such as teaching, practice, or worship); and (3) nondiscrimination on
the basis of religion.133 These three elements are evident in both
international law and domestic law, including the law of the United
States. 134
The following discussion considers the content and purpose of
each of the three principles of religious liberty in detail. The analysis
then evaluates whether and to what extent the various concepts are
reflected in Hobby Lobby to determine the degree to which the
Supreme Court's reasoning is consistent with international consensus
on each of these points. 35
1. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Religion
The principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion is a
direct extension of Locke's notion of toleration, which posits that no
one should be detrimentally affected by virtue of his or her religious
beliefs and practices.1 36 However, "mere" toleration is often
133. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 6-7 (Kevin Boyle
& Juliet Sheen eds., 1997) (identifying constituent elements of religious rights);
Choper, supra note 81, at 337-39 (describing aspects of religious rights); Durham,
supra note 132, at 31-35 (considering function of religious rights); Johan D. van der
Vyver, Introduction: Legal Dimensions of Religious Human Rights: Constitutional
Texts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 30, at xi, xlv (comparing aspects of religious rights); JOHN WITTE, JR. & M.
CHRISTIAN GREEN, The American Constitutional Experiment in Religious Human
Rights: The Perennial Search for Principles, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 497, 516-17, 521, 525
(identifying component elements of religious liberty); Silvio Ferrari, The New Wine and
the Old Cask: Tolerance, Religion and the Law in Contemporary Europe, 10 RATIO
JURIS 75, 78-79 (1997) (comparing rationales for religious rights); Little, supra note 30,
at 47, 55-58 (noting basis for religious rights); S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel
and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights
and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 181 (1997) (outlining types of
religious liberties).
134. However, empirical studies suggest that wholesale compliance with the
enunciated standards does not exist anywhere in the world, including in the United
States. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 133 (discussing comparative
compliance with international standards); see also Submission to the U.N., supra note
12 (discussing the U.S.'s lack of compliance with international standards).
135. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
136. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 27, 63-64 (excluding atheists and those who
would give members of their faith special privileges from his scheme of protection).
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considered an insufficient means of protecting individuals from state
interference, since toleration constitutes "a revocable concession
rather than a defensible right."1 37
Most modern nation-states therefore typically recognize an
explicit right to nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.1 38 Indeed,
Michael McConnell has written that the concept has become "an
indispensable element in a regime of religious liberty," since without
such protections "the religious decisions of the people will be
distorted."1 3 9
Several international human rights instruments require
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. For example, Article 2 of
the Universal Declaration states, "Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction
of any kind, such as .. . religion.""4o Similar language is found in
Article 2 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (European Convention).141 The Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (E.U. Charter) also
addresses this issue, noting in Article 20 that "[e]veryone is equal
before the law" and prohibiting discrimination based on religion or
belief in Article 21.142 These instruments, which are widely ratified,
reflect the current mainstream of human rights jurisprudence.143
137. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Founding Fathers and the Courage to Doubt, in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 207, 209 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985); see also
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 73-74 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (citing Philip
Kurland's distinction between toleration and religious freedom); Thomas C. Berg,
Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 730 (1997) (attributing the
same idea to James Madison).
138. See Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 85 (noting
comparative acceptance of principle of nondiscrimination); Little, supra note 30, at 47
(discussing adherence to principle of nondiscrimination).
139. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 733 n.212.
140. Universal Declaration, supra note 69, art. 2.
141. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 14, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention];
ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 2. Similar protections are couched in equal protection terms
in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration and Article 26 of the ICCPR. See ICCPR,
supra note 67, art. 26; Universal Declaration, supra note 69, art. 7.
142. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
[hereinafter E.U. Charter]; see also Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000
(establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation),
2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (prohibiting "any direct or indirect discrimination based on
religion or belief' except to "prevent or compensate for disadvantages").
143. There are currently 168 states parties to the ICCPR. See Status of Treaties,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-4&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 22, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/BA7Z-GGWU] (archived Mar. 17, 2015). Forty-seven states have
ratified or acceded to the European Convention. See Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE TREATY OFFICE,
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=
15/08/2014&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) [http://perma.cc/X7G7-HH58]
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The most comprehensive and explicit language concerning
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion or belief is found in the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
(Declaration on Discrimination).1 44 Although the Declaration on
Discrimination constitutes a form of "soft law" and therefore has no
binding force,' 4 5 the instrument is nevertheless considered highly
persuasive in the field of religious liberties.' *
As its name suggests, the Declaration on Discrimination
specifically prohibits discrimination based on religion. 4 7
Discrimination, along with intolerance, is defined as "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on an equal basis."1 4 8
Discrimination on the basis of religion is also prohibited as
matter of national law, although different countries do so in different
manners. For example, the United Kingdom, as an established state,
historically provided the Church of England with certain protections
and benefits not shared by other faiths.1 49 As a result, the country
(archived Feb. 22, 2015). The E.U. Charter is binding on the twenty-eight member
states of the European Union and will be binding on any future member states. See
E.U. Charter, supra note 142, art. 51; EU Member States, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/indexen.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8632-Y85Q] (archived Feb. 22, 2015).
144. See G.A. Res. 36155, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/36/55, at 171 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Discrimination]. The United
Nations has also adopted various resolutions on the elimination of all forms of religious
intolerance. See G.A. Res. 50/183, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/183 (Mar. 6, 1993); G.A. Res.
48/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/128 (Dec. 20, 1993).
145. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons From
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 594-99, 624-25 (2008) (discussing soft
law from a U.S. perspective); Andrew Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft
Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 222 (2010) (discussing soft law from an international
perspective).
146. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 133, at 5 (noting
persuasive power of Declaration on Discrimination); Lerner, Religious Human Rights,
supra note 66, at 114 (contextualizing Declaration on Discrimination); Donna J.
Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on
the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 488
(1988) (discussing impact of Declaration on Discrimination).
147. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 2(1).
148. Id. art. 2(2); see also Sullivan, supra note 146, at 501-06 (discussing
definition of discrimination).
149. See Peter Cumper, Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 205,
217-19 [hereinafter Cumper, Religious Liberty] (discussing religious rights under
British law); St. John A. Robilliard, Religion, Conscience and Law, in LAW AND
RELIGION, supra note 30, at 265-67 (describing religious liberty in Great Britain).
Although some jurists believe that a country with an established faith must experience
religious discrimination on some level, other experts disagree. See Durham, supra note
132, at 15-25 (considering whether religious discrimination must exist in an
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has experienced a certain amount of religious discrimination over the
years, particularly in certain geographic regions (most notably
Northern Ireland)15 0 and in certain subject matter areas (such as
immigration,15 1 blasphemy, 15 2 and the status of the monarch and
high-ranking public officials1 5 3).
However, the principle of religious nondiscrimination has been
established for decades as a matter of statutory law in a number of
established state); John F. Wilson, Church and State in America, in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 137, at 97, 105 (considering effects of an established
faith).
150. Northern Ireland has a long history of sectarian strife and discrimination
against Roman Catholics, with Catholics at one time experiencing unemployment rates
at approximately two-and-a-half times that of Protestants. See Cumper, Religious
Liberty, supra note 149, at 232-33 (describing history of discrimination in Northern
Ireland). The government responded by enacting specific legislation, particularly in the
area of employment, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion and making it a
criminal offence to incite religious hatred. See, e.g., Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47,§§ 6, 24, 68-78, 98; Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989, c. 32, §§ 49-55;
Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Designation of Public Authorities) Order 2001/1294
(Explanatory Note) T 1; Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Designation of Public Authorities)
Order 2001/1787 (Explanatory Note) ¶ 1; Employment and Treatment (Northern
Ireland) Order 1998/3162, art. 2; Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act (Northern
Ireland) 1970, ch. 24; COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, LAW, BLASPHEMY AND THE
MULTI-FAITH SOCIETY: REPORT OF A SEMINAR ORGANISED BY THE COMMISSION FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY AND THE INTERFAITH NETWORK OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 13 (1990)
(discussing status of religious discrimination in Northern Ireland); Cumper, Religious
Liberty, supra note 149, at 232-33 (noting religious-legal issues in Northern Ireland);
see also ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 20(2) (prohibiting incitement of religious hatred).
151. See R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Moon, The Times 8
December 1995. The U.K. lifted its ban on the immigration of Scientologists in 1980.
See James T. Richardson, Minority Religions, Religious Freedom, and the New Pan-
European Political and Judicial Institutions, 37 J. CHURCH & STATE 39, 52-54 (1995)
(discussing treatment of Scientologists under British law). Notably, discrimination in
the area of immigration was at one time condoned by the Court of Justice of the
European Community (as it then was). See Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (discussing immigration of Scientologists under European law).
152. At one point, the Court of Appeal refused to extend the common law crime
of blasphemy (which has recently been repealed by statute) to cover non-Christian
faiths. See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, ch. 4, § 79 (Eng.); R v. Chief
Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 Q.B. 429 (CA) (Eng.); see
also Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90 12(4) HUM. RTS. L.J. 172, 172
(1991) (finding no "link between freedom from interference with the freedoms of Article
9 para. 1 of the [European] Convention and the applicant's complaints"); COMMISSION
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, supra note 150, passim (discussing blasphemy law in Great
Britain); SEBASTIAN POULTER, ETHNICITY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ENGLISH
EXPERIENCE 62 (1999) (discussing Choudhury).
153. As a matter of law, the monarch may not be or marry a Roman Catholic,
although the prohibition on marriage has been under debate and may shortly be
removed. See Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.); Bob Morris,
Succession to the Crown: Possible Untoward Effects?, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 186, 186
(2013) (discussing Succession to the Crown Bill 2012). Similarly, the office of Lord
Chancellor only became open to Roman Catholics in the mid-1970s. Compare Lord
Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions) Act, ch. 25, § 1
(1974) (Eng.), with Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, § 12 (Eng.); see also
Cumper, Religious Liberty, supra note 149, at 211.
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areas. 154 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stated clearly in 1991 that
"no distinction between institutions of the Christian church and those
of other major religions would now be generally acceptable."1 55 Even
more critically, the United Kingdom's legal position regarding
religious discrimination has changed radically with the enactment of
the Human Rights Act 1998, which applies directly to public
authorities.1 56 According to the Human Rights Act 1998, parties
involved in disputes in domestic courts in the United Kingdom may
expressly rely on many of the provisions found in the European
Convention, including Article 14, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of religion.1 57 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the adoption of the
Human Rights Act 1998 has led to a significant increase in the
number and diversity of claims involving religious liberties. 5 8 In
construing the various rights, British courts are to take into account
decisions from the European Court involving relevant provisions of
154. See Hall, supra note 30, at 20. For a survey of some of the relevant
legislation, see Satvinder S. Juss, The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain, 1995 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 481, 506-16 (1995).
155. See Bumper Dev. Corp. v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1
W.L.R. 1362, 1372 (CA) (Eng.) (involving legal standing of a Hindu temple); see also
Neville Estates v. Madden [1962] Ch. 832, 853 (Eng.) (stating that "between different
religions the law stands neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at least likely to be
better than none"). Interestingly, Bumper Development stands for the proposition that
certain legal persons (in this case, a Hindu temple) have standing to bring a legal
claim, which is an issue that is somewhat similar to that considered in Hobby Lobby.
See Bumper Dev., [1991] 1 W.L.R. at 1373; Lloyd v. Sec'y of State for Transport [2006]
EWHC 315, [70] (QB) (Eng.) (discussing the legal status of automobiles versus religious
organizations, including temples); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. However,
the temple in Bumper Development was a religious organization, unlike the
corporations in Hobby Lobby. See id.; Bumper Dev., [1991] 1 W.L.R. at 1372-73.
156. See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, §§ 6, 22(6) (Eng.); Cumper, Section 13,
supra note 66, at 254 (discussing applicability of Human Rights Act). The indirect
horizontal effect of the Act to private entities was established by the Court of Appeal in
Douglas v. Hello! [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, [2001] Q.B. 967 (Eng.). For a discussion of
the horizontal applicability of the Act, see ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
PRIVATE SPHERE (Oxford Univ. Press 1996); Nicholas Bamforth, The Application of The
Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private Bodies, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
159 (1999); Murray Hunt, The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act, [1998]
PUBLIc LAW 423.
157. See European Convention, supra note 141, art. 14; Human Rights Act,
1998, ch. 42, § 13, sch. 1 (Eng.).
158. See, e.g., Bull v. Hall, [2012] UKSC 73 (Eng.) (regarding religious rights of
hotel keepers); R. (In re Williamson) v. Sec'y of State for Edue. & Emp't [2005] UKHL
15 [9-10] (Eng.) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (concerning biblical injunction regarding
corporal punishment in schools); Raabe v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2013]
EWHC (Admin.) 1736 (Eng.) (regarding employment concerns); R. (Eunice Johns and
Owen Johns) v. Derby City Council, [2011] EWHC (Admin.) 375 (Eng.) (regarding
religious liberties of foster parents).
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the European Convention. 159 Interestingly, the European Court has
also seen an increase in religious claims in recent years.1 60
Ireland also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion,
with the Irish Constitution specifically stating that "[t]he State shall
not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground
of religious profession, belief or status."161 Interestingly, Ireland is in
some ways more protective of religious liberty than other
jurisdictions, since Irish constitutional protections can, in proper
circumstances, address both public and private acts.162
Some concerns about the potential for religious discrimination
could be raised with respect to the pro-Christian language found in
the Irish Constitution.1 63 However, the Irish Supreme Court held in
Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney General that these provisions
do not limit the benefits of the state to those professing Christian
beliefs. 164
Quinn's Supermarket involved a claim by the plaintiff
supermarket that a statutory exemption from Sunday trading laws
allowing Jewish shopkeepers to remain open on Sunday constituted a
form of religious discrimination.1 65 In deciding this matter, the
Supreme Court of Ireland was faced with an issue very similar to that
159. See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 2 (Eng.) (noting applicability of the
European Convention in United Kingdom); see also European Convention, supra note
141.
160. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United Kingdom,
Case No. 7552/09, ECHR (discussing legal status of a Mormon temple); Eweida v.
United Kingdom, 57 E.H.R.R. 8 (ECHR) (2013) (concerning clothing requirements in
employment); Juma Mosque Congregation v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 15405/04, (2013) 57
E.H.R.R. SE5 (ECHR) (2013) (concerning registration of a religious congregation);
Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, 53 E.H.R.R. 4 (ECHR) (2011) (regarding
registration of a religious community); Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 117 (2000) (concerning a change in leadership among Bulgarian Muslims);
J6natas E.M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 451, 472-73 (2005) (discussing cases from the European Court).
161. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 44(2)(3); see also id. arts. 40(6)(1)(1), 44(2)(2); Eoin
Daly, Religious Discrimination Under the Irish Constitution: A Critique of the Supreme
Court Jurisprudence, 7 CORK ONLINE L. REV. 28, 28-44 (2008) [hereinafter Daly, Irish
Constitution] (discussing Irish jurisprudence on religion).
162. See BEYTAGH, supra note 79, at 126 (discussing scope of religious liberties
in Ireland); Hunt, supra note 156, at 428-29 (describing effect of religious rights laws
in Ireland). Those constitutional provisions that begin with the words "the State" are
least likely to apply to private discrimination. See Siobhin Mullally, Equality
Guarantees in Irish Constitutional Law - The Myth of Constitutionalism and the
"Neutral State," in IRELAND'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION, 1937-97: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 154-55 (Tim Murphy & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (analyzing Irish
Constitution). Some of the provisions concerning religion include this formulation and
some do not. See IR. CONST., 1937, arts. 40(b)(1)(i), 44 (discussing religious rights).
163. See IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl., art. 44; see also supra note 77 (quoting the
relevant language).
164. See Quinn's Supermarket v. Att'y Gen., [1972] I.R. 1, 15, 23-24 (Walsh, J.)
(Ir.); see also Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 41 (discussing views of G.W.
Hogan).
165. See Quinn's Supermarket, [1972] I:R. at 15, 23, 24 (Walsh, J.) (Ir.).
842
HOBBY LOBBY ASA JURISPRUDENTIAL ANOMALY?
involved in Hobby Lobby, namely the ability of a corporation to claim
a violation of its religious rights.1 66 Notably, the Irish Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion as the U.S. Supreme Court, holding
that
the plaintiff could not rely upon Article 40.1 [of the Irish Constitution]
as it was a body corporate and was therefore incapable of coming within
the ambit of a provision which related solely to "human persons." It was
held that "this guarantee refers to human persons for what they are in
themselves rather than to any lawful activities, trades or pursuits
which they may engage in or follow." Furthermore, the plaintiff had not
suffered any "disabilities ... on the ground of religious belief,
profession or status" because any such disability suffered would have to
relate to the religious belief, profession or status of the plaintiff, which,
as a body corporate, was incapable of having a religious affiliation. 1 6 7
The Court in Quinn's Supermarket also had to deal with the
apparent conflict between two core principles of religious liberty:
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion and free exercise of
religion.' 6 8 In deciding how to resolve that issue, the Supreme Court
of Ireland focused on the historical context of the right in question-a
technique also advocated by Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby-as
well as the purpose of the particular provision as a whole. 6 9
In general, there is little case law arising under Article 44 of the
Irish Constitution, a phenomenon which Gerard Hogan believes "is
ample proof of the absence of any overt discrimination or favoritism
on the part of the State in religious matters."170 Going forward,
Ireland is unlikely to adopt any discriminatory measures, since its
status as a Member State of the European Union and a signatory of
the European Convention requires it to respect various types of
166. See id.; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. Some people may see
parallels with McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which also dealt with
Sunday-opening laws, but McGowan specifically stated that
appellants allege only economic injury to themselves; they do not allege any
infringement of their own religious freedoms due to Sunday closing. In fact, the
record is silent as to what appellants' religious beliefs are. Since the general
rule is that "a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or
immunities," we hold that appellants have no standing to raise this contention.
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 429-30 (citations and footnote omitted).
167. Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 30 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
from Quinn's Supermarket, [1972] 1 I.R. 1).
168. See Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 31 (describing tension in
Quinn's Supermarket).
169. See id. (adopting historical approach); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. See G.W. Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland
From Independence to the Present Day, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 47, 73 (1987); see also IR.
CONST., 1937, art. 44.
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European case law concerning religious liberties, even if the decisions
are not directed to Ireland specifically.' 7
In many ways, the U.S. approach is not so different from that
reflected in other jurisdictions. Although the U.S. Constitution does
not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion,1 72 the
general principle of nondiscrimination contained in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is usually
considered a sufficient safeguard against religious discrimination. 7 3
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly prohibited religious
discrimination in Everson v. Board of Education by forbidding
passage of "laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."1 74
However some commentators see a discrepancy between policy
and practice. For example, Stephen Carter views cases such as Bob
Jones University v. United States1" 5 as demonstrating a tendency by
the federal government to control unpopular religious practices
through taxation policies.1 76 Because small religious groups cannot
operate their schools and colleges without the substantial tax relief
given to them as charitable institutions, threatening to change their
tax status can result in a change to religious practices.' 7 7
171. See European Convention on Human Rights Act (Act No. 20/2003) (Ir.),
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0020/index.html [http://perma.cc/
SZ53-JHCC] (archived Feb. 23, 2015) (describing status of the European Convention in
Ireland); Grainne de Burca, The Domestic Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 49 IRISH JURIST 49, 50-54, 56-57 (2013) (discussing the national effect of the
E.U. Charter and the European Convention in Ireland); Katherine Lesch Bodnick,
Comment, Bringing Ireland Up to Par: Incorporating the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396,
397 (2003) (discussing religious rights in Ireland). However, some commentators see
legislation regarding religious education as discriminatory in nature. See Daly, Irish
Constitution, supra note 161, at 36 (noting discrepancies in religious rights); see also
Employment Equality Bill 1996 (Ir.); In re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill
1996 [1997] 2 I.R. 321 (Ir.) (describing scope of Employment Equality Bill 1996).
172. But see MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
MORAL PERSPECTIVES 15 (1997) (claiming both clauses of the First Amendment require
nondiscrimination).
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."); see also id. art. IV, § 2 ("The
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states.").
174. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
175. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding federal policy not unconstitutional).
176. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 147, 150-52 (1994) (discussing Bob
Jones University). The case involved federal attempts to require Bob Jones University,
which opposed inter-racial dating and marriage on religious grounds, to adopt racially
neutral admission policies or risk losing its religious tax exemption. See id. (discussing
Bob Jones University); see also Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 574.
177. See CARTER, supra note 176, at 147, 150-52 (describing effect of tax policies
on religious institutions).
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Other, more direct, means of discrimination also exist. For
example, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah involved an
attempt by the city of Hialeah, Florida, to curtail animal sacrifice by
Santeria practitioners through the passage of facially neutral animal
cruelty laws.1 78 Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck the laws in
question as being unconstitutional, the case demonstrates that
religious discrimination exists in U.S. legal and popular culture,
despite statements to the contrary.1 79
One recent example of religious discrimination involves attempts
to adopt legislation limiting state courts' ability to rely on anything
other than U.S. state or federal law as a means of blocking the
influence of Shari'a law in the domestic U.S. context.1 80 Thirty-three
U.S. states have tried to adopt legislation of this nature, with five
such laws having been successfully enacted.18 1
Perhaps the best-known of these provisions involved a proposed
amendment to the Oklahoma state constitution indicating that
[t]he Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law
as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of
another state of the United States provided the law of the other state
does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia
Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the
respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first
impression.182
178. See 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
179. See id.
180. See Michael Kirkland, Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Islamic Law in U.S.
Courts, UPI, May 19, 2013, http://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2013/05/19/Under-the-
US-Supreme-Court-Islamic-law-in-US-courts/64481368948600/ [http://perma.cc/E924-SM7S]
(archived Feb. 23, 2015) (discussing Save Our State amendment and similar
provisions).
181. See John R. Crook, Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma
Anti-Sharia, Anti-International Law Constitutional Amendment, 106 AM. J. INT'L L.
365, 365 (2012) (discussing Save Our State amendment); Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State
Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 107,
107-17 (2012) (outlining attempts to outlaw Shari'a law in U.S. courts); David L.
Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law Obstruct the
Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1647, 1652-53 (2012)
(discussing ramifications of anti-Shari'a laws); John T. Parry, Oklahoma's Save Our
State Amendment and the Conflict of Laws, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (describing
effect of Oklahoma legislation).
182. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Awad v.
Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (providing for permanent
injunction).
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This provision was judicially enjoined in federal court on First
Amendment grounds and is therefore invalid in its current form.' 8 3
However, commentators have suggested that some of these laws may
be upheld if they can be drafted in a way that does not affect religious
liberties.1 84 If enforced, these laws could have a significant impact on
U.S. law and society, for although most commentators have focused
on the effect these provisions would have in state courts,18 5 the
substantive standards would also apply in federal courts hearing
cases in diversity.1 86
Although the principle of nondiscrimination was not discussed
directly in Hobby Lobby, the issue did arise by implication.187 For
example, Justice Ginsburg noted that the rule enunciated by the
majority would allow religious claims to be treated differently than
other types of moral claims and "'be perceived as favoring one religion
over another,' the very 'risk the Establishment Clause was designed
to preclude."" 88 Allowing some corporations to refuse to participate
183. See Awad, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (providing for permanent injunction);
Crook, supra note 181, at 365 (discussing Awad case).
184. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma
and Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87
IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 13 (2011) (discussing viability of anti-Shari'a statutes); Penny M.
Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like It
That Bar State Courts From Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189,
215 (2011) (concluding anti-Shari'a statutes are unconstitutional); Jay Wexler,
Government Disapproval of Religion, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 119, 145 (2013) (analyzing
anti-Shari'a legislation).
185. See Davis & Kalb, supra note 184, at 9-15 (discussing effect of anti-Shari'a
statutes); Fellmeth, supra note 181, at 113-17 (analyzing effect of anti-Shari'a
legislation); Venetis, supra note 184, at 201-16 (considering ramifications of legislation
barring Shari'a law from U.S. courts).
186. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); S.I. Strong,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and
Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 91-92 (2014) (noting the ways in which state law
affects enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. federal courts).
187. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2789
n.6, 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For example, although the majority in Hobby
Lobby spent a significant amount of time discussing the financial ramifications
associated with not allowing the religious exemptions to stand, the majority did not
consider the possibility of any market distortion that might arise as a result of allowing
plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 2759, 2769-72, 2776-77. The majority also refused to
consider arguments relating to the possibility of offsetting the penalty payments with
saved insurance costs. See id. at 2776. Finally, the majority also did not consider the
various tax benefits that plaintiffs could receive if they reorganized as a religious
nonprofit or the fact that nonprofit organizations may engage in commercial activity
that is unrelated to their primary (tax exempt) purpose. See Diane L. Fahey, Taxing
Nonprofits Out of Business, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 549-50 (2005) (discussing
commercial activities of religious entities); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV.
1111, 1165 n.219 (2011) (noting religious entities may engage in commercial behavior).
Thus, the claim by the majority that denying plaintiffs' claim would rob the
shareholders of any ability to participate in the commercial life of the country is not
well-supported. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
188. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789 n.6, 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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fully in the PPACA could also provide them with a commercial or
other market advantage over corporations who are required to comply
with all of the terms of the PPACA. 89 Notably, this type of
commercial benefit was prohibited by the Supreme Court in Tony and
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,19 0 a case involving a
not-for-profit religious organization that funded itself largely from
commercial activities. In that case, the Court held that
the Foundation's businesses serve the general public in competition
with ordinary commercial enterprises, and the payment of substandard
wages would undoubtedly give petitioners and similar organizations an
advantage over their competitors. It is exactly this kind of "unfair
method of competition" that the [Fair Labor Standards] Act was
intended to prevent, and the admixture of religious motivations does
not alter a business's effect on commerce. 19 1
These observations suggest the need for a full-fledged law and
economics analysis of the effect of Hobby Lobby, although that
analysis is beyond the scope of the current Article. 192 Nevertheless, as
this discussion has shown, the decision gives rise to a number of
problems under the principle of religious nondiscrimination.
2. Freedom of Religious Belief
Nondiscrimination constitutes only one element of religious
liberty. Traditionally, states have also protected freedom of religious
belief. Many theologians and legal scholars believe that freedom of
religious belief is the most important aspect of religious liberty,' 9 3
189. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2010); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2776-77, 2780-81 (discussing the various benefits associated with being
seen to provide health insurance, even without full contraceptive coverage, since that
coverage will be provided at the insurers' cost).
190. 471 U.S. 290, 299 (1985).
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751; see Michael W. McConnell & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
1-2 (1989) (considering religious rights from a law and economics perspective).
193. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18 (noting critical importance of freedom of
religious belief); Michael E. Dyson, "God Almighty Has Spoken From Washington,
D.C." American Society and Christian Faith, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 129, 131 (1992-1993)
("[T]he most important distinction is not between conduct and mere belief, but between
freedom of conscience and the coercion to believe."); McConnell, First Freedom, supra
note 10, at 1250-53 (noting that freedom of conscience is at the heart of liberal
democracy). But see Michael J. Baxter, "Overall the First Amendment Has Been Good
for Christianity" - Not!: A Response to Dyson's Rebuke, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 428
(1994) (challenging Dyson). Interestingly, some commentators believe that freedom of
conscience is no longer at the heart of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United
States. See Rend Reyes, Common Cause in the Culture Wars?, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 231,
231-32 (2011-2012) (considering relationship between freedom of conscience and First
Amendment jurisprudence); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and
Secularization: The Shaking Foundations of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO
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and the protection has shifted over time from "mere" toleration of
diverse religious beliefs to a legal right, just as in cases involving
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. 194
Because belief by itself seldom threatens the state or the social
order, most legal systems grant religious belief absolute protection.
Thus, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief ... ."195 Similar language is found in Article 18(1) of the
ICCPR,196 Article 9(1) of the European Convention,1 97 and Article 10
of the E.U. Charter. 9 8
The Declaration on Discrimination also grants individuals the
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion."19 9 Although that
document does not include a definition of religion or belief, the
travaux prdparatoires suggest that both nontheistic and atheistic
beliefs are entitled to protection.20 0 Other international instruments
on religious rights are also considered to protect atheism.2 0 '
L. REV. 1755, 1756-57 (2011) (discussing First Amendment jurisprudence in the wake
of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as
recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751); Ren6 Reyes, Justice Souter's Religion
Clause Jurisprudence: Judgments of Conscience, 43 CONN. L. REV. 303, 306 (2010)
(noting Justice Souter consistently protected freedom of belief during his tenure on the
Supreme Court); Nadine Strossen, Religion and the Constitution: A Libertarian
Perspective, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25-33 (2005-2006) (discussing libertarian versus
egalitarian rights analyses).
194. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 27, 32, 55-56 (outlining early views regarding
religious rights).
195. Universal Declaration, supra note 69, art. 18.
196. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 18(1). Article 18(2) of the ICCPR goes on to
state that "[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice." Id. art. 18(2).
197. See European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others. . . .").
198. See E.U. Charter, supra note 142, art. 10. The E.U. Charter notes that, "[i]n
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
[European Convention], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as
those laid down by the said Convention." Id. art. 52(3).
199. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 1.
200. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 518 (discussing working papers from
Declaration on Discrimination); see also Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note
66, at 115 (describing scope of protection in Declaration on Discrimination).
201. See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (discussing protection of
atheism in the European Convention); FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note
133, at 5 (comparing treatment of atheists around the world); Peter W. Edge, Current
Problems in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1996 JURID. REV.
42, 43 (considering atheism under the European Convention); Courtney W. Howland,
The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of
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Although the international standard regarding freedom of
religious belief is relatively clear, national provisions are somewhat
more problematic. For example, Article 44 of the Irish Constitution
states that "[f]reedom of conscience and the free profession and
practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality,
guaranteed to every citizen."202 As the provision currently stands,
freedom of conscience would appear to be restricted by reference to
public order and morality, although no court appears to have ever
explicitly addressed the point.203 However, the Supreme Court of
Ireland has held that atheism is included within these protections. 204
The situation is more complicated in the United Kingdom,
particularly with respect to whether atheism is protected as a
religious belief, since certain early judicial statements suggested that
only theistic beliefs could be considered religious in England and
Wales.20 5 However, some legislation, most notably the Oaths Act
1978, gave special consideration to atheists.20
The advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 means that freedom of
religious belief in the United Kingdom is strongly influenced by the
principles enunciated in Article 9 of the European Convention.20 7
Since the European Court has stated that Article 9 of the European
Convention covers atheism, British courts will likely do so as well
going forward.2 0 8
The United States is another jurisdiction that is said to provide
absolute protection to the freedom of religious belief, which includes
Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
271, 342 (1997) (considering atheism under the U.N. Charter).
202. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 44.
203. See id. The Constitution Review Group recommended in 1996 that the
restrictive language be dropped with respect to religious belief, although that proposal
has not yet been implemented. See CONSTITUTION REVIEW GROUP, supra note 77, at
358 (proposing elimination of certain language); G.F. Whyte, Discerning the
Philosophical Premises of the Report of the Constitution Review Group: An Analysis of
the Recommendation on Fundamental Rights, 2 CONTEMP. ISSUES IR. L. & POL. 216,
220 (1998) (noting recommendations of the Constitution Review Group have not been
adopted).
204. See McGee v. Att'y Gen., [1974] I.R. 284, 316-17 (Ir.).
205. See Barralet v. Att'y Gen., [1980] 3 All E.R. 918, 924 (Dillon, J.) (Eng.) ("[I]t
is natural that the court should desire not to discriminate between beliefs deeply and
sincerely held ... . But I do not see that that warrants extending the meaning of the
word 'religion' so as to embrace all other beliefs and philosophies."); R v. Registrar
Gen., ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 Q.B. 697, 708 (Lord Denning, M.R.) (Eng.) (noting that
a place of worship must be one where people come together "to do reverence to God. It
need not be the God which the Christians worship . . . but it must be reverence to a
deity," although Buddhist temples constituted an exception).
206. See Oaths Act 1978, ch. 19, § 4(2) (Eng.).
207. See European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9; Human Rights Act 1998,
ch. 42, art. 9 (Eng.); supra note 156 and accompanying text.
208. See Angeleni v. Sweden, App. No. 10491/83, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 41 (1986); EVANS, supra note 201, at 55; supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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atheism. 209 The right is jurisprudentially based on the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution and the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut.210
Freedom of religious belief per se was not specifically discussed
in Hobby Lobby.211 However, this component of religious liberty is
respected under both the majority and the dissenting approaches. 212
3. Freedom of Religious Practice
Of the three basic religious rights, freedom of religious practice
has proven to be the most difficult as both a theoretical and a
practical matter and is, of course, at the heart of the Hobby Lobby
case. 213 Although Locke believed that his principles of toleration
sufficiently addressed the problem of the "just bounds" between
religious and temporal affairs,214 conflicts still arise between a
religious actor's rights, interests, and duties, on the one hand, and
the rights, interests, and duties of the state or other individuals, on
the other.215
To some extent, these problems may be the result of the
traditional distinction between religious belief and practice, which a
209. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (protecting atheists);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185-86 (1965) (protecting conscientious
objectors); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (discussing religious beliefs
of government officials); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)
(considering religious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses); Marci A. Hamilton, The
Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A
Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713,
728-31 (1993) (discussing status of freedom of religious belief in the United States);
Joseph Grinstein, Note, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment Implications
of Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L.J. 1347, 1356 (1996)
(discussing belief-behavior dichotomy). Marci Hamilton has claimed that there are only
four cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has found a violation of the right to freedom
of belief. See Hamilton, supra, at 728-31 (analyzing U.S. First Amendment
jurisprudence); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977) (regarding
Jehovah's Witnesses who objected to license plates carrying New Hampshire's slogan,
"Live Free or Die"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1961) (regarding a
Maryland statute requiring political candidates to declare their belief in God); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1944) (regarding a jury instruction that required
jurors to consider the validity of the defendants' religious views); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-29 (1943) (discussing flag salutes).
210. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."); Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 304; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (providing basis
for freedom of religious belief); Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 938
(discussing genesis of freedom of religious belief in the United States).
211. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778; see also id. at 2798-99, 2805.
212. See id. at 2778; id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).
213. See id. at 2759.
214. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18.
215. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790-91, 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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number of commentators find unworkable. 216 This principle was
perhaps most cogently expressed by Ronald Dworkin, who took the
view that some actions that are nonreligious on their face
nevertheless contain an element of religious or moral choice such that
the actions are inseparable from the beliefs that inspire them. 217 As a
result, many of the controversies that Locke hoped to resolve still
exist, despite (or perhaps because of) current formulations of the right
to religious practice. 218
The precise manner in which states implement the right to
religious practice is more complex than it is with respect to
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion and freedom of religious
belief. When considering this issue, it is important to distinguish
between two separate elements. The first, which involves the scope of
protection given to religious practices as a matter of law, is relatively
easy to describe. The second, which involves the identification of the
type of religious practices that merit protection, is much more
difficult. Each of these concerns is discussed separately.
a. Scope of Protection Given to Religious Practices
216. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1994) (discussing belief-behavior dichotomy);
Durham, supra note 132, at 27, 30 (considering distinction between religious belief and
practice); Hall, supra note 30, at 22-23 (analyzing freedom of belief and practice);
Phillip E. Hammond & Eric M. Mazur, Church, State, and the Dilemma of Conscience,
37 J. CHURCH & STATE 555, 561 (1995) (claiming the distinction has been abandoned by
the U.S. Supreme Court); Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 938 (discussing
genesis of belief-behavior dichotomy); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of
the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 840 (1995) (considering belief-behavior distinction under
U.S. law); see also Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996)
(considering belief-behavior dichotomy under the European Convention); Emp't Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488, as recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. The reasoning is similar
to that used in U.S. free-speech cases, wherein courts give special protection to acts
that are deemed symbolic and therefore communicative. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S
No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO 105-06 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1994) (considering communicative acts); Choper, supra note 81, at 338 (claiming
"most rituals, rites, or ceremonies of religious worship - such as fasting, confessing, or
performing a mass - that may be denominated as constituting 'action' rather than
'belief' or 'expression,' fall squarely within the protection the Court has afforded to
nonverbal 'symbolic speech'); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, in LAW AND
RELIGION, supra note 30, at 205, 217 nn.57-58 [hereinafter Tushnet, Religion]
(considering scope of freedom of religious practice); Weiss, supra note 40, at 83-84
(claiming, in particular, that the majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), appeared to rely on free-speech rationales);
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545, passim (1983) (analogizing free speech and freedom of religious
practice).
217. See DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 15, 26, 150, 157-59 (considering nature of
religious acts).
218. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 133 (providing
empirical data on how religious liberties fare globally).
2015] 851
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL 48:813
Unlike the right to religious belief, the right to practice religion
is not absolute. Instead, religious practices are typically limited by
reference to some external right or interest. Thus, for example,
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration states that
[iln the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society.2 19
Other international instruments contain similar limitations, with the
ICCPR stating in Article 18(3) that the "[fjreedom to manifest one's
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others."220 Article 9(2) of the European Convention contains
substantially similar language, 221 while the E.U. Charter requires
that, "[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the
rights and freedoms of others." 222
The Declaration on Discrimination also limits the right to
manifest one's religion to situations which do not threaten "public
safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others." 223 This instrument is unusual, however, in that
it contains a list of religious practices that are guaranteed protection,
including, inter alia, the freedom to worship and assemble, to
establish charitable institutions, to make and use items for use in
religious rituals, to write and publish on religious matters, to teach,
to solicit funds, to train and appoint religious leaders, to observe
religious holidays and days of rest, and to communicate with others
regarding religious matters. 224
The international human rights documents that safeguard
religious practices do so on both an individual and group level. For
example, Articles 18 of the Universal Declaration, 18(1) of the ICCPR,
9(1) of the European Convention, and 10(1) of the E.U. Charter grant
everyone the right "to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance," recognizing that the right can be
exercised "either alone or in community with others and in public or
219. Universal Declaration, supra note 69, art. 29. The substantive right to
religious practice, which contains no limiting language, is found in Article 18. See id.
art. 18.
220. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 18(3).
221. See European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9(2).
222. E.U. Charter, supra note 142, art. 52(1).
223. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 1.
224. See id. art. 6; NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (1991) (considering constituent elements of religious practice).
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private."22 5 The ICCPR also states in Article 27 that "persons
belonging to [religious and other] minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language." 22 6
Domestic means of protecting religious practice differ little from
the international human rights approach. For example, the Human
Rights Act 1998 essentially requires the United Kingdom to use the
same standard for protection as the European Convention, which
protects the
[freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs ... subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. 22 7
Religious groups receive special consideration under the Human
Rights Act 1998.228 Thus, "[i]f a court's determination of any question
arising under this Act might affect the exercise by a religious
organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have
particular regard to the importance of that right."2 2 9
Ireland also subjects the practice of religion "to public order and
morality." 230 However, as Francis Beytagh has noted, "how 'morality'
would qualify the practice of religion is somewhat confusing."23 ' No
further light can be shed on this language as a matter of Irish law,
since no cases appear to have been decided under this provision.23 2
225. E.U. Charter, supra note 142, art. 10(1); ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 18(1)
(varying language slightly); European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9(1); Universal
Declaration, supra note 69, art. 18(1).
226. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 27.
227. European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9; see also Human Rights Act
1998, ch. 42, art. 9, sch. 1, (Eng.). In this regard the Act does not differ significantly
from the common law standards applied prior to 1998. See Cumper, Religious Liberty,
supra note 149, at 228-29 (discussing religious liberty under English common law). But
see Malory Nye, Minority Religious Groups and Religious Freedom in England: The
ISKCON Temple at Bhaktivedanta Manor, 40 J. CHURCH & STATE 411, 415 (1998)
(claiming there are "no clear legal protections for religious practice" in England).
228. See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, § 13 (Eng.).
229. Id.; see also Cumper, Section 13, supra note 66, at 260-65 (considering
religious liberty under the Human Rights Act 1998).
230. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 44(2)(1).
231. BEYTAGH, supra note 79, at 161. Laws based on morality are
jurisprudentially difficult in any context. See S.I. Strong, Justice Scalia as a Modern
Lord Devlin: Animus and Civil Burdens in Romer v. Evans, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4,
n.7 (1997) (discussing basis of morality legislation); S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and
the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1997)
(discussing justifications for morality legislation).
232. The Constitution Review Group recognized the problems associated with
limiting the practice of religion based on morality. See CONSTITUTION REVIEW GROUP,
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However, the language in Article 44(2)(1) is substantially similar to
that found in Article 9(2) of the European Convention, which suggests
that any Irish court considering this issue in the future could look to
European jurisprudence for guidance. 233
The United States also subjects religious practice "to regulation
for the protection of society." 234 For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a
case concerning the withdrawal of Amish children from state
education before the age of sixteen, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted
power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare."23 5 Other
U.S. Supreme Court cases have held that the Constitution was not
intended "as a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society." 236
b. Definition of Religious Practices
Describing the legal parameters of the freedom of religious
practice is relatively easy. However, defining precisely what
constitutes a "religious practice" deserving of protection is much more
difficult, particularly in light of the claim that some acts that are
nonreligious on their face may nevertheless contain an element of
religious or moral choice such that the behaviors cannot be considered
separable from the beliefs that inspire them. 237
Traditionally, only so-called core activities such as worship,
observance, practice, and teaching were considered religious practices
as a matter of law. 238 However, the realities of contemporary society
have made it necessary to expand the list of recognized religious
supra note 77, at 357-59; Whyte, supra note 203, at 220-22 (discussing Constitution
Review Group analysis).
233. See IR. CONsT., 1937, art. 44(2)(1); European Convention, supra note 141,
art. 9(2); European Convention on Human Rights Act (Act No. 20/2003) (Ir.), available
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/enlact/pub/0020/index.html [http://perma.cc/SZ53-
JHCC] (archived Feb. 23, 2015). Case law in this field is growing. See European Court
of Human Rights, HUDOC (search under article 9-2); see also supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
234. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
235. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
236. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (involving belief-orientated
qualifications placed on suffrage). However, Davis is not necessarily good law with
respect to its key holding regarding restrictions on voting. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (discussing voting restrictions).
237. See DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 15, 26, 150, 157-59 (discussing nature of
religious acts). In many ways, the issues are similar to those that arise with respect to
the definition of religion. See supra notes 29-115 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 1(1); ICCPR,
supra note 67, art. 18; European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9; Universal
Declaration, supra note 69, art. 18.
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practices,239 and a number of additional activities are described as
religious practices in the Declaration on Discrimination. 24 0 Thus, that
instrument states,
In accordance with article 1 of the present Declaration, and subject to
the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following
freedoms:
(a) To worship or assemble in connexion with a religion or
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or
humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the
necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of
a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in
these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these
purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other
contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession
appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards
of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or
belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals
and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national
and international levels. 2 4 1
Although the catalogue of practices remains relatively short, this
list considerably expands the definition of what constitutes a
protectable religious practice. 242 However, the analysis cannot stop
here, since parties can and do assert claims regarding behaviors that
are not specifically described in the Declaration on Discrimination. 243
To some extent, these types of novel claims can be brought
because the Declaration on Discrimination is not in any way binding
as a matter of national or international law. 244 However, these claims
239. Some commentators have suggested that the traditional concept of religious
practices reflect a Christian perspective and that religious liberties law must change to
take into account the realities of other faith traditions. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLUIPA, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1914-15 (2011) (discussing religiously pluralist societies).
240. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 6.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
243. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 6.
244. See id.; see also supra notes 145 and accompanying text.
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also arise because an increasing number of people support the view
that a religious claim or practice should be defined simply as "one
which asks for adherence on the grounds of religious truth, or one
which is defined or spoken by its author as religious."245 Because the
emphasis in this definition is on the nature of the underlying
motivation rather than the nature of the act itself, legal claims are
now being made with respect to behaviors that do not fall within the
standard rubric of a recognized religious practice. 246
Applying this definition to Hobby Lobby yields some intriguing
analytical issues. 24 7 The first question, which was largely ignored by
both the majority and the dissent, involves the proper identification
of the religious practice in question. The assumption in Hobby Lobby
appears to have been that the relevant act was the desire not to
participate fully in the PPACA. 24 8 However, the decision to organize
as a commercial corporation rather than a religious nonprofit appears
to be equally relevant to this particular dispute, particularly since (1)
the relief sought (nonpayment of the costs in question) was available
under the alternate corporate form and (2) the act of creating a
religious organization is protected as a recognized religious
practice. 249 Furthermore, reorganization as a religious nonprofit
would allow the shareholders to fulfil their alleged religious desire to
provide health insurance for their employees without the need to
provide access to contraception that the shareholders find
objectionable.2 50
Given these features, the decision to organize as a commercial
corporation rather than a religious nonprofit could very well be seen
as a waiver of the right to object to the contraceptive mandate on
religious grounds. 251 Although most discussions of waiver in the
context of First Amendment claims appear to focus on issues relating
to freedom of speech and freedom of the press rather than freedom of
religious belief or practice, there does not appear to be any theoretical
245. Weiss, supra note 40, at 78. The majority in Hobby Lobby suggests that this
approach is the only possible way to avoid determinations as to the truth of the
underlying claim, but that allegation is incorrect. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778;
see also id. at 2798 n.21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. See Weiss, supra note 40, at 78 (discussing breadth of recent religious
rights claims); see also DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 15, 26, 150, 157-59 (discussing
nature of religious acts).
247. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
248. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2010); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2759.
249. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 6(b); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2763.
250. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763, 2776.
251. The majority alluded to this principle, although it did not discuss it at
length. See id. at 2759.
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reason why parties cannot waive their religious rights.25 2 A full
discussion of that issue is unfortunately beyond the scope of the
current Article, but the analysis of the religious practice claimed to be
at issue here (i.e., nonprovision of health insurance that would
provide access to certain types of contraceptives) is fulsome enough
for current purposes.
The first point to recognize is that this activity does not qualify
as an established form of religious practice.25 3 The majority in Hobby
Lobby attempts to sidestep concerns associated with the novelty of
the claim by framing the issue as one of "exercise of religion," rather
than "practice of religion," based on the relevant statutory language
and stating that "'the exercise of religion' involves 'not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstension from) physical acts'
that are 'engaged in for religious reasons."' 254 Given the breadth of
this definition, it is unsurprising that the majority concludes that
"[b]usiness practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a
religious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition."25 5
In many ways, the majority's test appears to be reducible to mere
religious motivation, even though that approach was specifically
rejected by Congress during the enactment of RFRA. 256 Furthermore,
international and comparative authorities agree that religious
motivation by itself cannot give rise to a cognizable religious right,
since "no system could countenance the right of anyone to believe
anything and to be able to act accordingly." 257
252. See Michael Rhea, Comment, Denying and Defining Religion Under the
First Amendment: Waldorf Education As A Lens for Advocating a Broad Definitional
Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1117-18 (2012) (discussing waivers of religious rights);
John Robinson, Note, Neither "Ministerial" Nor an "Exception": The Ministerial
Exception in Light of Hosana-Tabor, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1151, 1155-62 (2014)
(considering possibility of waiver of religious rights); Bradford S. Stewart, Comment,
Opening the Broom Closet: Reorganizing the Religious Rights of Wiccans, Witches, and
Other Neo-Pagans, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 135, 188-89 (2011) (analyzing nature of
religious rights); Michael G. Weisberg, Note, Balancing Cultural Integrity Against
Individual Liberty: Civil Court Review of Ecclesiastical Judgments, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 955, 980-86 (1992) (describing nature of various rights).
253. See, e.g., Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, arts. 1(1), 6;
ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 18; European Convention, supra note 141, art. 9; Universal
Declaration, supra note 69, art. 18.
254. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (citing Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), superseded by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488, as recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751).
255. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770.
256. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between a
religious belief or practice and the conclusion that a religious right exists and
discussing Senator Kennedy's proposal regarding RFRA).
257. Grainger PLC v. Nicholson, [2010] I.C.R. 360, [26] (Burton, J.) (Eng.)
(quoting Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and Non-Discrimination, in NON-
DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 119, 131 (Tita Loenen & Paulo R.
Rodrigues eds., 1999)); see also McConnell, Origins, supra note 10, at 1461-66 (noting
limits of religious rights); supra notes 219-36 and accompanying text.
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Because Justice Ginsburg identified a number of ways in which
the accommodation requested by the plaintiffs affected the rights of
others, the dissent in Hobby Lobby appears to be more in accord with
international and comparative standards than the majority.258 In
particular, Justice Ginsburg focused on the ways in which the
majority approach infringed on the religious rights of others.25 9 For
example, her opinion noted that
allowing a religion-based exemption to a commercial employer would
"operat[e] to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees."
No doubt the Greens and Hahns and all who share their beliefs may
decline to acquire for themselves the contraceptives in question. But
that choice may not be imposed on employees who hold other beliefs. 2 6 0
The importance of religious rights suggests that the best
approach is one that does not involve the clash of those particular
values. Interestingly, framing the relevant question as involving the
shareholders' decision to incorporate as a commercial corporation
would avoid a clash of religious rights. 2 61 Such a technique seems to
be much preferred to the current situation, both as a matter of theory
and practice.
The majority approach in Hobby Lobby exhibits a number of
other problems. 262 For example, none of the traditional types of
religious practices (worship, observance, practice, and teaching)
reflect the type of attenuation seen in Hobby Lobby, either as a
structural matter (i.e., as between the natural person holding the
underlying religious belief and the entity purporting to engage in the
religious act) or as a factual matter (i.e., as between the entity
258. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790-91, 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing various third-party rights); see also id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the exercise of religion may not "unduly restrict other persons,
such as employees, in protecting their own interests the law deems compelling").
259. See id. at 2787, 2790-91, 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
statutory rights as well as an employee's right not to have an employer's religious
beliefs imposed upon him or her). Justice Ginsburg also specifically referred to Justice
Jackson's observation that "the limitations which of necessity bound religious
freedom . . . begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties
of others or of the public." Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Price v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
260. Hobby Lobby, 132 S. Ct. at 2804 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 261 (1981)).
261. For example, if shareholders decide to incorporate as a for-profit
organization, then they would be seen as waiving the ability to make a religious claim
on behalf of the corporation. However, in that situation, the employees' religious rights
would be respected. Alternatively, if the shareholders decided to incorporate as a
religious nonprofit, then they would retain their ability to right to make a religious
claim on behalf of the corporation. In that case, the employees would waive their rights
to make religion-based claims against the corporation. Although each scenario involves
one party having to relinquish certain rights, the parties do so with full prior
knowledge. Furthermore, this approach eliminates the possibility of conflicting
religious claims.
262. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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making the religious claim and the entity making the decision to
engage in the religiously offensive act).2 63 The expanded list of
religious practices found in the Declaration on Discrimination also
involves activities that exhibit a much more direct connection
between the religious person and the relevant behavior, both as a
structural and factual matter.264
Furthermore, the only other case known to have addressed the
religious rights of a corporation, Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v.
Attorney General, specifically rejected the approach adopted by the
majority in Hobby Lobby.265 Instead, the Supreme Court of Ireland in
Quinn's Supermarket adopted a view of religious rights that was
consistent with the dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby.266
As this discussion has shown, the majority in Hobby Lobby
appears to be distinctly out of step with the international and
comparative understanding of religious liberty. 267 However, the
majority decision might still be considered acceptable if it can be
shown that the newly enunciated rule falls within one or more of the
rationales supporting the existence of religious rights, since the
decision could then be said to represent a logical extension of
established norms. 268 The following section considers that proposition
by evaluating the theoretical justifications supporting religious rights
and considering the extent to which the majority and dissenting
opinions in Hobby Lobby can be said to reflect those particular
norms.269
IV. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS SUPPORTING RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
Over the years, courts and commentators have developed a wide
range of theories supporting the protection of religious rights. 270
263. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 18; European Convention, supra note
141, art. 9; Universal Declaration, supra note 69, art. 18; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The acts at issue in Hobby Lobby are also much
more attenuated that actions considered in Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana Emp't
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
264. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, arts. 1(1), 6.
265. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759; Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Att'y
Gen., [1972] I.R. 1 (Ir.) (holding that a commercial corporation cannot profess religious
beliefs and therefore cannot assert religious rights); see also Daly, Irish Constitution,
supra note 161, at 30 (discussing Quinn's Supermarket).
266. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct. at 2805-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Quinn's
Supermarket, [1972] I.R. 1; see also Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 30
(discussing Quinn's Supermarket).
267. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
268. See McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 10, at 1244 (discussing nature of
religious liberties).
269. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
270. See SMITH, supra note 137, at 63-71 (discussing justifications for religious
rights); Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES
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Unfortunately, the indiscriminate and sometimes conflicting use of
various rationales has resulted in a body of jurisprudence that can at
times appear disturbingly ad hoc.271 This problem is particularly
acute in the United States, where the unique structure of the First
Amendment has generated constitutional tests, which often lack
internal consistency.272
Problems can also arise as a result of the need to balance
individual religious demands against other rights and interests,
which may be both fundamental and incommensurable.2 73 Some
commentators believe that these traits make it impossible to conduct
a determination of religious rights fairly and impartially.274
Fortunately, other commentators have taken the view that such
analyses are indeed possible. 2 75 Indeed, a number of models currently
exist to assist with the task of balancing competing rights and
interests.276
OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 83-87 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990)
[hereinafter Sandel, Freedom of Conscience] (describing rationales for religious liberty).
271. See Nye, supra note 227, at 411 (identifying conflicts in religious rights
theory); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 596-97 (2014) (considering difficulties relating to
religious rights).
272. See Berg, supra note 137, at 693-94 (discussing inconsistencies in First
Amendment jurisprudence); Edge, supra note 201, at 44 (outlining conflicting
principles in religious liberties); Nye, supra note 227, at 413 (noting problems of U.S.
approach to religious rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements,
108 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1769 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized]
(considering challenges of First Amendment law). For example, commentators have
long recognized an inherent conflict between the two clauses of the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. See Berg, supra note 137, at 702 (noting tension between
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause); Underkuffler-Freund, supra note
216, at 982 (considering conflicts in First Amendment jurisprudence).
273. See J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 327, 331 (1969) (weighing various rights); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note
109, at 736 (considering rights of various parties); Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social
Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943) (discussing relative weights of various rights);
West, supra note 271, at 597 (considering rights balancing under U.S. law).
274. See A. BRADNEY, RELIGIONS, RIGHTS AND LAWS 8 (Leicester Univ. Press
1993) (identifying problems with weighing religious rights); Lupu, Where Rights Begin,
supra note 90, at 950 (discussing rights balancing in religious context); McConnell &
Posner, supra note 192, at 46, 51 (undertaking a law and economics approach to
religious rights); Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized, supra note 272, at 1748 (noting
problems of weighing incommensurable rights).
275. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 101 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1997) (suggesting a method of weighing incommensurable rights); William
J. Aceves, Predicting Chaos? Using Scenarios to Inform Theory and Guide Practice, 45
VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 607-09 (2005) (proposing approach to balance rights); Virgilio
Alfonso Da Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles,
Balancing and Rational Decision, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 286, 301 (2011)
(discussing balancing tests).
276. Some models promote the maximization of rights while others focus on the
protection of the "minimum core" of a particular constitutional concern. See Margaux J.
Hall & David C. Weiss, Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration: Equilibrating
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One of the more helpful approaches has been identified by Cass
Sunstein, who advocates the creation of "a highly disaggregated
picture of the consequences of legal rules, a picture that enables the
judge to see the various goods at stake."277 Each situation is then
placed into context so as to avoid making decisions in the abstract. 278
This Article adopts Sunstein's approach by deconstructing the
rationales underlying religious rights and determining whether and
to what extent those rationales describe the majority and dissenting
opinions in Hobby Lobby.279 This type of analysis is perhaps the only
way to evaluate the relative merits of the opinions in this dispute.
Close examination of the literature and case law in this field
suggests that most authorities rationalize religious liberty on the
basis of five separate but interrelated concerns. Thus, religious rights
are considered theoretically justifiable to the extent they promote
civil peace, minimize alienation, further personal autonomy, promote
self-definition, or further the search for truth. Some commentators
believe it impossible to identify any overarching theoretical construct
but would nevertheless support religious liberty as a prudential
arrangement. Each of these propositions will be discussed in more
detail below and then considered in light of Hobby Lobby to determine
whether and to what extent the majority decision reflects each
particular principle. 280
A. Religious Rights Promote Civil Peace
The best-known rationale supporting religious liberty holds that
protection of religious beliefs and practices promotes civil peace.2 8 '
Although this justification was first enunciated during the time of
Locke,28 2 contemporary theorists also recognize the role that religious
rights play in encouraging social stability, particularly in cases
Socio-Economic Rights, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453, 469, 489-90 (2011) (analyzing
various methods of balancing rights).
277. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS, supra note 275, at 99. Sunstein's suggestion
accords with his belief in the value of incompletely theorized agreements, which focus
on pragmatic agreements without delving unnecessarily into underlying and
potentially divisive jurisprudential principles. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional
Agreements Without Constitutional Theories, 13 RATIO JURIS 117, 117 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Agreements] (advocating a pragmatic approach to constitutional
law).
278. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS, supra note 275, at 101.
279. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
280. See generally id.
281. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1143 (Foundation Press 1999) (discussing rationale for religious rights); LOCKE,
supra note 1, at 18 (stating religious freedom is based on need for civil peace); SMITH,
supra note 137, at 106-09 (describing basis for religious liberty).
282. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18 (describing rationale behind religious
freedom).
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involving a potential conflict between civil and religious duties.28 3
The thought is that respecting religious liberties minimizes the
possibility of civil disobedience because those who would otherwise
feel religiously compelled to act contrary to the particular law are
allowed to follow the dictates of their conscience. 284 Protecting
religious liberty is also believed to encourage people to adopt religious
values and practices that support social order.28 5
This justification for religious rights views religious actors as
more of a threat to the state than persons who are motivated only by
political concerns. This conclusion is apparent in statements by
Christopher Eisgruber that "three features - resistance to
persuasion, cohesiveness, and resistance to compromise - make
religious factions an especially virulent threat to the vigor of
republican politics."286 David Rapoport similarly argues that while
any dissatisfied citizen can resort to civil disobedience, religious
persons or groups may be more likely to do so because "[a]ll major
religions have enormous potentialities for creating and directing
violence."28 7 Rapoport also believes that "[w]hen a religious
justification is offered for a cause which might otherwise be justified
in political or economic terms, the struggle is intensified and
complicated enormously." 288 Nations that provide protection for
religious beliefs and practices thereby minimize the number of
conflicts between the individual and the state.
The scope and intent of these sort of protections are also
embodied in Michael McConnell's definition of the "accommodation"
of religious belief and practice as involving "government laws or
policies that have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or
facilitating the exercise of, a person's or an institution's religion." 28 9
An accommodation can also be described as an exemption from a
generally applicable rule and can be used to refer to any action that is
intended to give effect to individuals' religious claims, desires,
demands, or interests.2 9 0
283. See, e.g., JOHN A. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvii-xix (1996)
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] (tying religious liberty to civil peace).
284. See id. (linking civil order and religious freedom).
285. See SMITH, supra note 137, at 101-04 (discussing effect of religious liberty).
286. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager. Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 372-73 (1995).
287. David C. Rapoport, Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and
Groups, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES, AND
MILITANCE 429, 446 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1996).
288. Id.; see also MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR? RELIGIOUS
NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE 156, 198 (1993) (discussing problems of
religious violence); Eisgruber, supra note 286, at 372-73 (noting issues relating to
religious conflict).
289. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 686.
290. See id. at 687 (defining a religious accommodation).
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Not everyone agrees that religious accommodations promote civil
peace. Ellis West, for example, believes that granting religious
accommodations actually increases "ill will and divisiveness" by
provoking jealousy in those who do not receive similar benefits. 9 1
John Garvey has identified a different problem with rationales based
on social order. He notes that the civil peace rationale assumes that
''we can only have civil peace through religious freedom," when in fact
"there are other ways of avoiding strife: repression is one of them.
Unless freedom has some other good points, there is no reason to
prefer it to repression."292 Therefore, Garvey suggests that society
must justify religious liberty on grounds other than the desire to
promote civil peace.29 3
Garvey's point is valid, but only to the extent that repressive
measures effectively quash all dissent.294 While such tactics may
prevail in the short term, it is unlikely that they can withstand
internal and, in an era of global concern over human rights, external
pressure toward moderation in the long run. Indeed, international
responses to recent attacks by members of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) and the Boko Haram suggests that widespread acts
of religiously motivated violence will not go unaddressed.2 9 5
Turning to Hobby Lobby, the members of the majority did not
seem to be thinking about avoiding social unrest when they decided
to allow three closely held corporations to refuse to provide health
insurance that included coverage for certain contraceptives. 296
Instead, most of the majority's analysis focused on the corporations'
economic rights and their ability to participate in commercial
society.2 97 Although a number of commentators have taken the view,
with Montesquieu, that entities that are commercially engaged are
unlikely to engage in violent actions because of the negative effect
such behavior would have on their business interests, the
shareholders of the plaintiff corporations could still engage in
commercial activities if the corporations were not granted this
291. West, supra note 271, at 602.
292. John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275, 291 (1996) [hereinafter Garvey, Anti-Liberal].
293. See generally id. (identifying grounds for religious liberty).
294. See id. at 291 (noting limits of religious repression).
295. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Boko Haram Kidnaps 100 People, Most of Them
Freed, USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
world/2014/08/15/boko-haram-kidnaps-100-people-most-of-them-freed/14121489/
[http://perma.cc/788P-V5PS] (archived Feb. 24, 2015) (discussing religiously oriented
kidnappings in Nigeria); Helene Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2014, at Al (discussing religious violence in Syria and Iraq).
296. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
297. See id. at 2759, 2783. Although the majority alludes to various additional
"benefits .. . of operating as corporations," the majority does not discuss what those
benefits are other than the ability to lobby and support political candidates. See id. at
2767, 2771. Obviously, these are political, not religious, benefits and therefore outside
the scope of religious liberties law.
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particular accommodation.2 9 8 Furthermore, the shareholders could
engage in commercial activities if the shareholders were organized as
a religious nonprofit.29 9 Thus, the majority decision in Hobby Lobby
does not appear to be based in a desire to promote civil peace.30 0
B. Religious Rights Minimize Alienation
A second rationale supporting religious rights involves the desire
to minimize religious people's alienation from wider society.
Numerous commentators have claimed that religious people are
excluded from the political realm by virtue of the secular nature of
many Western states.30 1 However, religious rights are seen as
assuaging religious people's fear of being "second class citizens" and
minimizing any sense of alienation that religious people may feel.3 0 2
This justification is often linked to the concern about civil peace, in
that extreme alienation may lead to "destabilizing, antisocial activity,
including violence."3 0 3
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager view the problem of
alienation as associated with the "predominance of groups in religious
practice," since "[i]t is the group identity of the faithful that mobilizes
298. See Robert Howse, Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace,
31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 693, 693 (2006) (discussing Montesquieu's connection between
civil order and commercial practices); see also Timothy L. Fort, The Times and Seasons
of Corporate Responsibility, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 324 (2007) (suggesting that
imposition of corporate leaders' religious views does not lead to peace or constitute good
business). Although the majority suggests the penalties for nonprovision of the relevant
health coverage would be prohibitive in nature, experts suggested otherwise. See
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2776.
299. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 299 (1985)
(discussing a religious nonprofit's commercial activities); Fahey, supra note 187, at 547
(noting nonprofits may engage in commercial activities so long as they pay the
necessary taxes).
300. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
301. See CARTER, supra note 176, passim (discussing religious views in the
public market of ideas); John H. Garvey, Introduction: Fundamentalism and Politics,
in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES, AND
MILITANCE, supra note 287, at 13, 15, 17 (discussing perceptions of religious views in
public debate).
302. See John L. Esposito, Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy, 20 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 119, 125 (1996) (discussing effect of religious rights); Steven D. Smith,
Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497, 499 (1996)
[hereinafter Smith, Unprincipled] (discussing purpose of religious rights).
303. CARTER, supra note 176, at 129 (quoting Frederick Mark Gedicks); see also
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1956)
(discussing need for religious liberty); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at
693 (discussing purpose of religious rights); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Comments: Honderich
on Violence, in ISSUES IN LAW AND MORALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1971 OBERLIN
COLLOQUIUM IN PHILOSOPHY 37, 44-46 (Norman S. Care & Thomas K. Trelogan eds.,
1973) (discussing link between violence and violation of religious principles); Rapoport,
supra note 287, at 446-47 (considering religiously oriented conflict).
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pity, distrust, or even hatred for those who are not believers."3 0 4
While Eisgruber and Sager see alienation as arising from the beliefs
espoused by the religious group, alienation can also arise as a result
of actions taken by the religious majority that lead minority religious
believers to perceive themselves as being invisible in their own
societies.30 5
Members of religious minorities are often more closely attuned to
these sorts of issues than members of religious majorities, since those
who adhere to majority religious beliefs often overlook the extent to
which those values and practices are reflected in existing legal
norms. 306 For example, laws concerning marriage and national days
of rest typically reflect the majority's religious beliefs, thus creating
the potential for conflict with the values and practices of minority
faiths.3 0 7 Labeling the majority's practices as "merely" cultural
belittles their symbolic importance and ignores the very real burdens
that fall on those whose beliefs and practices differ.3 08
Some types of alienation are experienced regardless of whether
the beliefs in question are part of a majority or minority religious
tradition. For example, framing religiously motivated decisions as
"unreasonable"3 0 9 or "non-rational"3 10 tends to alienate religious
persons of all faiths.
The concern about alienation appears most relevant to
individuals or groups who wish to exist within the larger society.
Alienation appears to be less of an issue for people like the Amish,
who prefer to opt out of the wider social sphere and create their own
religious communities.
304. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1245, 1248-49 (1994).
305. See id.
306. See Ferrari, supra note 133, at 80, 82, 86; Asher Maoz, Religious Human
Rights in the State of Israel, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 349, 377; McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 721;
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 207, 216
(1992). For examples of specific case law, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (regarding polygamy); Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. [1972] I.R. 1 (Ir.)
(regarding religious days of rest); Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 4 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 126 (1981) (regarding timing of prayers); Stedman v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 29107/95, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 168 (1997) (regarding religious days of rest).
307. See Ferrari, supra note 133, at 82 (noting effect of discrepancies between
majority and minority religious practices; Maoz, supra note 306, at 377 (considering
hidden burdens placed on religious minorities).
308. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of
Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 978-79, 987-88 (2010) (noting effect of
complying with majority practices).
309. RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 283, at 61-62.
310. BASIL MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY, AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY 123
(1967); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 1043 (2014) (debating Brian Leitner).
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Although alienation could be a relevant concern in Hobby Lobby,
it is unclear whether granting the religious accommodation will make
those shareholders feel less alienated from wider society.311 The
objectionable forms of contraception will still be available and
employees who wish to use those forms of contraception will still be
allowed to do so. While the religious shareholders may feel some
small victory in being able to opt out of a policy initiative with which
they disagree, it is not clear whether and to what extent that
accommodation will make them feel more a part of larger society,
particularly since they can also achieve their desired ends either by
deciding not to provide health insurance with this particular coverage
or by reincorporating as a religious nonprofit.
The alienation analysis hearkens back to a point that was
previously made about the proper identification of the religious act in
Hobby Lobby.312 The shareholders here, having chosen not to
associate as a religious organization, want to obtain the same benefits
as a religious organization.3 1 3 The decision to band together as a
religious association is protected as a core religious liberty precisely
in order to minimize concerns about alienation. 314 Allowing
nonreligious (i.e., commercial) entities to invoke the special
protections granted to religious organizations does not achieve the
same ends and can indeed create ill-will in other members of society,
as discussed further below.315 Furthermore, concerns about
alienation do not appear to be relevant in Hobby Lobby to the extent
that this rationale is based on concerns about breaches of the peace,
for the reasons described above. 316 As a result, the majority opinion in
Hobby Lobby does not appear justifiable under the alienation
rationale, although this is admittedly a close call.31 7
C. Religious Rights Further Personal Autonomy
A third rationale supporting religious rights involves the desire
to further the exercise of personal autonomy. Although independent
religious choice can be characterized as inherently or intrinsically
worthy of protection, it can also be framed in more instrumental
terms.318 For example, it has been said that religious liberty helps
311. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764-66.
312. See id. at 2751; see also supra notes 248-62 and accompanying text.
313. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
314. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 432-52 and accompanying text.
316. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751; see also supra notes 296-300 and
accompanying text.
317. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
318. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 19-20, 55-56 (describing benefits of religious
liberty); Joseph Boyle, The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals
and Groups, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 21 (1998) (noting how religious rights benefit
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avoid certain socially detrimental behaviors (such as civil disorder)
that may result from the coercion of religious belief and practice. 319
Furthermore, a number of theorists believe that most attempts to
override choices made pursuant to individual religious belief will
ultimately fail.320
Legal theories based on personal autonomy are also consistent
with certain religious doctrines, particularly those faith traditions
that hold freedom of choice to be an integral part of the religious
experience. 321 However, legal theory and religious doctrine do not
always align so closely. For example, adherents of religious traditions
that emphasize conformity of behavior, rather than free religious
choice, may be less inclined to rely on autonomy as a rationale for
religious liberty.32 2
Legal theories endorsing personal autonomy rely implicitly on
the liberal separation of public and private spheres of life, where
personal preferences, including religious preferences, are relegated to
the private realm of life.323 Thus, religious traditions that do not
recognize any kind of distinction between public and private acts may
not find autonomy to be a useful basis for a claim for religious
rights.3 24
John Garvey has expressed some concerns about the autonomy
rationale based on his belief that such theories make "assumptions
about human nature . . . that are inconsistent with convictions that
many religious people hold."32 5 He would therefore consider reversing
the common assumption that theorists must "assume the agnostic
viewpoint" and would instead ask "agnostics to assume the religious
viewpoint." 326
individuals and society); Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 284 (discussing
advantages of religious freedoms).
319. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 19-20, 55-56 (describing benefits of religious
liberty); Boyle, supra note 318, at 21 (noting how religious rights benefit individuals
and society); Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 284 (discussing advantages of
religious freedoms).
320. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 19-20, 55-56 (describing benefits of religious
liberty); Boyle, supra note 318, at 21 (noting how religious rights benefit individuals
and society); Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 284 (discussing advantages of
religious freedoms).
321. See Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 284-85 (discussing advantages
of religious freedoms).
322. See id. (discussing advantages of religious freedoms).
323. See Tushnet, Religion, supra note 216, at 236 (discussing public-private
dichotomy).
324. See DWORKIN, supra note 216, at 15, 26, 150, 157-59 (characterizing the
nature of religious acts).
325. Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 290; see also Esposito, supra note
302, at 128 (discussing religious worldview).
326. Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 290; see also Esposito, supra note
302, at 128 (noting perspective of religious persons).
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The autonomy rationale is also problematic from the perspective
of religious traditions that permit compulsion of religious belief3 27 or
that forbid adherents from exiting the faith.328 In these cases,
respecting one person's religious beliefs and practices results in the
violation of another person's religious beliefs and practices. Since a
robust reading of religious liberty includes both a positive element
(i.e., the affirmative right to exercise one's religious beliefs and
practices) as well as a negative element (i.e., the defensive right not
to be required to engage in religious beliefs and practices that are
contrary to one's own beliefs and practices), the principle of autonomy
cannot be relied upon to provide a definitive answer in all
circumstances.3 2 9
Considering these principles in the context of Hobby Lobby yields
some interesting results.3 3 0 The shareholders of the various
corporations appear on first glance to be claiming an autonomy-based
right, in that they do not wish to be required to participate in an act
(the use of certain types of contraceptives) that is contrary to their
religious beliefs.33 1 Although this would initially appear to be a clear
example of a negative religious liberty (i.e., the desire not to be forced
to act in a way contrary to one's religious beliefs), the analysis runs
into several problems. First, the link between the religious person
and the act in question (use of a particular contraceptive) is
extremely attenuated, as Justice Ginsburg noted, with two separate
breaks in the relevant chain of decision making.33 2 The claim is also
being made through the vehicle of a corporation rather than by the
religious person him or herself, even though the earlier decision to
incorporate as a commercial entity could itself be characterized as
religious in nature.3 33 These types of practical and theoretical breaks
in proximity diminish the force of the autonomy rationale in this case.
Second, the corporate shareholders' concerns about being forced
to undertake actions contrary to their religious beliefs can be met in
327. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 202-03
(Henry Paolucci ed., 1962) (discussing compulsion of religious belief).
328. See Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights
and Practices, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) (considering problems if
exit is not allowed).
329. See Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 762
(2012) (considering positive and negative aspects of liberty).
330. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
331. See id. at 2759. The corporations' participation is, of course, somewhat
attenuated, but that is the essence of the claim. See id.
332. See id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It is doubtful that Congress,
when it specified that burdens must be "substantia[1]," had in mind a linkage thus
interrupted by independent decisionmakers (the woman and her health counselor)
standing between the challenged government action and the religious exercise claimed
to be infringed.").
333. See id. at 2759; see supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text (discussing
waiver of religious rights).
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equal measure by a claim from the corporate employees that they do
not wish to be required to adhere to someone else's religious beliefs
and practices. 334 Although the decision to use a particular type of
contraceptive is seldom framed in religious terms, many women,
alone or in conjunction with their partners, consider whether and to
what extent a particular type of contraception is consistent with their
religious beliefs.33 5 Thus, there are religious rights to be considered
on both sides of the equation, as noted by Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent.3 3 6
Given this tension between different religious rights, it is
impossible to conclude that the majority in Hobby Lobby relied on the
autonomy rationale in any way.33 7 Instead, the concept of religious
autonomy is much more fully enunciated in the dissenting opinion.3 38
As a result, it is necessary to consider whether the majority holding
can be justified on other grounds.
D. Religious Rights Promote Self-Definition
A number of commentators claim that legal systems protect
religious beliefs because those beliefs "are 'important to a person's
sense of whom [sic] she is' and define a person's very being."' 33 9
Religious rights therefore promote self-definition, particularly an
individual's ability to identify with a religious group.340 Gidon Sapir
334. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790-91, 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing statutory rights as well as an employee's right not to have an
employer's religious beliefs imposed upon him or her).
335. The assumption by many people seems to be that any woman who uses
contraception is areligious or anti-religious. In fact, many religious women use or
support the use of contraception. See RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE,
COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND
CONTRACEPTIVE USE 3-8 (Haley Ball ed., 2011), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JV73-58WE] (archived Mar. 23, 2015) (discussing religious women's
views on contraception).
336. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790-91, 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
337. See id. at 2759.
338. See id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
339. See William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 391-92 (1996) [hereinafter Marshall, Ideas] (quoting
Stephen D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 202 (1991), and Daniel Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1164-65 (1988)); see also Edge, supra
note 201, at 49 (discussing religious belief in terms of self-definition); Grinstein, supra
note 209, at 1363-64 (characterizing religion as self-defining act).
340. See Marshall, Ideas, supra note 339, at 386 (noting collective aspects of
religious rights). A wide-ranging and lively debate exists about the legitimacy and
extent of group rights, although that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g.,
NEUS TORBISCO CASALS, GROUP RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A LIBERAL APPROACH TO
MULTICULTURALISM (Francisco J. Laporta et al. eds., 2006) (defining group rights); THE
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relates the idea of self-definition to autonomy, noting that "if we
cherish the ability of people to exercise their freedom to choose, we
must also protect their societal culture [including their religious
culture] from structural debasement or decay, because cultural
membership is a prerequisite for individuals to exercise their capacity
for choice and self-reflection."3 41
Self-definition therefore bears some similarity to personal
autonomy but gives special emphasis to the collective element of
religious rights. If one views "rights of religious autonomy" as
Laurence Tribe does (i.e., as including both choices about religion per
se and about dress, reproduction, livelihood, and how one is to
live), 34 2 then the right to self-definition may be subsumed within the
autonomy rationale. However, separating autonomy from self-
definition is a useful analytical step, since domestic and international
law both emphasize the collective aspect of religious liberty. 34 3 These
laws may have evolved as a continuation of earlier approaches that
formulated religious rights as group, rather than individual,
rights, 344 but they may also reflect the fact that religious persons
have never conceded the importance of protecting the communal
elements of practicing their faith.34 5
As attractive as this approach may appear, proponents of a group
rights approach to religious liberties experience a number of practical
difficulties in identifying how the group is to define its boundaries
and who has the power to decide doctrinal differences. 346 In addition,
as Mark Tushnet has noted, most constitutional models have trouble
"filtering a group right interest through an individual rights
model." 347
RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (discussing attributes of
group rights); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically
and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014)
(considering group rights theory in constitutional context); Symposium, 4 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 215 (1991) (discussing various aspects of group rights theory).
341. See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State - A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 579, 626 (1999).
342. See Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 275 (characterizing LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1154-301 (1988)).
343. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 206-07 (noting collective element of religious
rights); see also supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
344. See Lerner, Religious Human Rights, supra note 66, at 83-85 (discussing
history of religious liberty).
345. See CARTER, supra note 176, at 141-42 (discussing parameters of religious
rights claims); Robinson, supra note 5, at 206-07 (noting collective aspects of religious
liberty).
346. See Green, supra note 18, at 261 (noting problems with group rights);
James W. Nickel, Group Agency and Group Rights, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS:
NOMos XXXIX 235, 238, 241 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997) (discussing
challenges of group rights theory); see also Maoz, supra note 306, at 363 (discussing
group rights in context of Israeli religious rights).
347. Tushnet, Religion, supra note 216, at 238; see also Gerard V. Bradley,
Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order-The End of Church and State?, 49 LA.
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It cannot be denied that self-definition, either on the individual
or collective level, constitutes an important aspect of personhood.
Nations that limit religious people's ability to fulfill this side of
themselves risk alienating those people from greater society and thus
increase the possibility of social unrest.3 4 8 In this way, concerns about
personal autonomy, self-definition, and alienation constitute specific
means of achieving the broader goal of civil peace. Since civil peace is
an eminently proper state goal, so too are furthering autonomy and
self-definition as a means to that end.
Unfortunately, concerns about self-definition do not appear to
have been considered by the majority in Hobby Lobby.349 Indeed, the
most important aspect of self-definition, namely the right to form
religious groups, was entirely absent from the discussion, since
neither the plaintiff corporations nor their shareholders claimed that
their right to form a group was infringed in any way.35 0 To the
contrary, the shareholders faced a wide variety of choices on how they
might choose to align their interests and could very well have formed
a religious nonprofit, which is the type of group that is most often at
issue in theories regarding self-definition. 351
It might be possible to argue that the denial of the plaintiffs'
claim in Hobby Lobby would affect some type of associational right
because the shareholders would then have to reincorporate
themselves as a nonprofit organization if they wanted to fall within
the religious exception to the contraceptive mandate. 352 However,
that argument is largely unpersuasive because the shareholders
would not be barred from associating with one another but would
simply have to choose between the benefits and burdens associated
with two different types of corporate entities.
As a result, the majority in Hobby Lobby does not appear to have
relied on this particular rationale to justify its novel approach to
religious rights.353 To the contrary, self-definition appears to be much
more fully considered in the dissent, which discusses the principle of
religious autonomy in the group context when differentiating between
commercial corporations and religious nonprofits.354
L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1989) (discussing group rights issues); Marshall, Ideas, supra note
339, at 386 (discussing group rights as self-definition).
348. See supra notes 281-317 and accompanying text.
349. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
350. However, Justice Ginsburg discusses this aspect of religious rights. See id.
at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
351. The ability to form a religious group is protected by numerous human
rights instruments, most particularly the Declaration on Discrimination. See
Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 144, art. 6.
352. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
353. See id. Those aspects of self-definition that are related to concerns about
personal autonomy, alienation, and civil peace have already been discussed previously.
See supra notes 281-338 and accompanying text.
354. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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E. Religious Rights Further the Search for Truth
The final theoretical justification for religious rights involves the
proposition that religious liberty should be protected because it
furthers the search for truth. The assumption here is that freedom of
religion fosters discovery and debate in the same way that freedom of
speech fosters greater understanding of politics and science.3 55 As
Joseph Boyle writes,
[p]olitical society is morally obliged to create the social space for people
to fulfil their obligation to seek the truth in religious matters and live
accordingly. It cannot do this if political life is conducted as if a certain
outcome of this inquiry - whether a particular type of belief or nonbelief
- were correct.
35 6
The need to protect individual conceptions of truth is particularly
important in the area of religion because some faith traditions hold
that violations of religious obligations lead to punishment after
death.3 5 7 Therefore, John Garvey believes that the pursuit of religious
truth should be granted even greater protection under the law than
the pursuit of other types of truth, since the harm suffered "is more
serious (loss of heavenly comforts, not domestic ones) and more
lasting (eternal, not temporary)."3 58 Because religious truth is beyond
human understanding and no one can say which religious tradition is
correct, everyone must enjoy the ability to search for truth equally.35 9
Interestingly, this aspect of religious liberty is often
implemented in an uneven manner. For example, some commentators
believe that many jurisdictions have a tendency to support and
protect liberal religions, which are defined as those faiths that "accept
the liberal position that the governments must be impartial among
all philosophically reasonable religions," while simultaneously
disfavoring or discriminating against illiberal religions, which are
defined as those faiths that insist "that the government endorse or
355. See Clark, supra note 273, at 336 (discussing freedom of religion as a
search for truth); Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 286 (noting religious liberty
promotes the search for truth); see also FISH, supra note 216, at 124 (discussing
expressive acts); Marshall, Ideas, supra note 339, at 392-93 (discussing religion in the
context of identity).
356. Boyle, supra note 318, at 22.
357. See A DICTIONARY OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION 518 (S.G.F. Brandon ed.,
1970) (defining purgatory); Clark, supra note 273, at 337 (noting some violations of
religious edicts have effect after death); Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 286
(discussing ramifications for the afterlife).
358. Garvey, Anti-Liberal, supra note 292, at 287.
359. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 19, 29, 55-56 (noting religious liberty promotes
search for truth); Eisgruber, supra note 286, at 349 (noting inability to know which
faith tradition is correct).
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favor their particular creed as the one truth faith."36 0 Some
jurisdictions also adopt an illiberal approach to religion by mandating
a particular religious faith and criminalizing any deviation from the
politically prescribed norm.3 61
Although the latter group of legal systems might seem to take
the more problematic approach to religious rights, commentators
have recognized that "liberalism's disapproval of illiberal religions is
necessarily a rejection of these illiberal religions as theologically
unsound." 362 As Michael Sandel notes in his discussion of the way in
which liberalism brackets, or sets aside, certain moral and religious
questions in relation to politics,
If ... there really were such a thing as witches, then it would surely be
less reasonable to bracket theology and metaphysics . . . . The more we
are convinced that those who believe in witches are deluded, the
greater our confidence in the case for bracketing the controversy about
the existence of witches. To this extent, the political argument against
witch-hunts is parasitic on (some degree of confidence about) the
theological and metaphysical arguments. 3 6 3
Therefore, discriminating against a particular faith because it does
not accept certain liberal political tenets reflects a judgment about
the legitimacy of the underlying religious doctrine.364
Although promoting the search for religious truth is a laudatory
aim, some commentators worry that a broad definition of religious
rights encourages commitment to belief systems that are inconsistent
with the liberal democratic state.365 Ira Lupu, for example, claims
that certain faiths "make intense demands for obedience by
360. Edward B. Foley, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman:
Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
963, 973-74 (1993).
361. For example, North Korea only permits state-supported forms of
Christianity. See Aldir Guedes Soriano, Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious
Freedom, 2013 BYU L. REV. 581, 600 (2013) (discussing religious rights in North
Korea). Sudan recently sentenced a woman to death for apostasy relating to her
conversion to Christianity from Islam, although she was eventually allowed to leave
the country. See Giselda Vagnoni & Khalid Abdel Azis, Death Row Christian Woman
Flies Out of Sudan, REUTERS (July 24, 2014 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/07/24/us-sudan-christian-convert-idUSKBNOFTOTO20140724
[http://perma.cc/J283-B5DE] (archived Feb. 24, 2015) (discussing religious rights in
Sudan).
362. See Foley, supra note 360, at 974.
363. Michael J. Sandel, Judgmental Toleration, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM,
AND MORALITY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 107, 108-09 (Robert P. George ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Sandel, Toleration].
364.. See Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's
Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 612 (1993) (suggesting how some analyses
presuppose the truth of certain religious beliefs).
365. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 738 (discussing effect of
broad religious accommodations).
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adherents," which can "undermine rather than mutually reinforce
habits of mind necessary for democratic decisionmaking." 366
This position contradicts the notion that religion deserves special
protection because it encourages civic virtue and promotes peace367 as
well as political theories that hold that religion, of itself, is a basic or
intrinsic good. 368 The idea that religion, taken seriously, is a danger
to individuals and society is also problematic on the grounds that it
takes as its underlying and unspoken premise the idea that religion
cannot be true.36 9 Such a position also faults religion for its central
tenet that something more important than the temporal order exists.
If religion were true, there would be no reason to deny its claims to
allegiance and indeed every reason not to do so. If one adheres to the
notion that religious truth cannot be objectively ascertained, then one
cannot prejudge the content of various claims or limit them
arbitrarily, as Michael Sandel has so eloquently noted. 370
If religious rights are meant to further the search for truth, then
all types of religious beliefs must be respected to avoid making
choices among equally valid (or potentially valid) claims to truth.
Because other types of beliefs do not carry the same ramifications
that religious beliefs do (i.e., those that carry over beyond this
lifetime into the eternal), they therefore do not invoke the same need
for protection.
Applying this analysis to Hobby Lobby is somewhat problematic
for the majority because truth-based rationales for religious liberties
are based largely on concerns about the ability to spread information
about the religion in question. 371 These concerns are taken into
366. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 597-98
(1991); see also SMITH, supra note 137, at 102 (discussing anti-liberal beliefs);
McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 738-39 (discussing effect of broad
religious accommodations).
367. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 303, at 48 (suggesting religious liberty
promotes civic order); SMITH, supra note 137, at 101 (discussing possibility that
religious freedom encourages peace); see also supra notes 281-300 and accompanying
text.
368. Theorists holding these views range from John Rawls, who includes
freedom of conscience among the six basic goods contained within his theory of justice,
to John Finnis, who holds freedom of religion to be "self-evidently good" within his
theory of natural law and natural rights. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 85-86, 89-90, 98 n.IV.2, 410 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980); see also JOHN
RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971) [hereinafter RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]
(listing freedom of conscious as a basic good). Thus, commentators who argue that
Rawls's work improperly excludes religious belief from the public sphere base their
criticisms on a faulty premise. See Michael V. Hernandez, Theism, Realism, and Rawls,
40 SETON HALL L. REV. 905, 905-06 (2010) (suggesting Rawls does not give due weight
to religious concerns).
369. See Sandel, Toleration, supra note 363, at 108-09 (analyzing the bracketing
of discussions about witches).
370. See id.
371. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
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account in traditional formulations of religious rights by protecting
the right to proselytize, teach, form religious associations, and change
one's religious affiliation.3 72 Not only is there nothing in the facts
outlined in Hobby Lobby that suggests any of these types of interests
are at stake, but the majority never even raises these types of
concerns. 373 Furthermore, refusing to allow a commercial corporation
to avoid paying for certain types of health insurance does not appear
to affect the search for religious truth in any way. Therefore, the
majority opinion cannot be based on this particular justification.
Some concerns could arise as a result of the majority's suggestion
that the approach advocated by the dissent improperly chooses
between differing notions of religious truth.3 74 However, the dissent
demonstrates how its approach avoids any truth-based distinctions or
limitations on religious belief.3 75
F. Religious Rights Constitute a Prudential Arrangement
Most commentators, regardless of their legal and philosophical
outlook, support a principled approach to religious liberties and
therefore adopt one of the theoretical frameworks described above as
a means of justifying religious rights.37 6 However, some analysts
believe that the conflicting jurisprudence in this area of law makes it
impossible to generate a single principled approach to religious rights
and therefore conclude that a compromise or modus vivendi may be
all that can be achieved in the area of religious liberty.37 7 Other
observers go even farther and claim that religious rights themselves
are the cause of many religio-political controversies, since religious
rights encourage litigiousness by suggesting that such matters can
and should be "decided on the basis of abstract constitutional
principles rather than by compromise and accommodation."37 8
372. See supra notes 283-342 and accompanying text.
373. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
374. See id. at 2778.
375. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2798-99 (citations
omitted) (noting that although a party "may not accept" the state's conclusions about
the use of certain data, "for the adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution,
rather than an individual's religion, must supply the frame of reference").
376. See FINNIS, supra note 368, at 89-90 (discussing importance of religious
liberty in natural rights theory); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 283, at
142-50 (claiming his theory of the overlapping consensus is not a mere modus vivendi);
see also George KIosko, Rawls's Argument From Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1882, 1890 (1994) (analyzing Rawls's philosophy).
377. See SMITH, supra note 137, at 59-61, 100 (noting conflicting jurisprudence
in this field); Smith, Unprincipled, supra note 302, at 501-02 (describing various views
regarding religious liberty); see also Miriam Galston, Rawlsian Dualism and the
Autonomy of Political Thought, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1842, 1858 (1994) (discussing
possibility of a modus vivendi).
378. See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 30, at 175, 189.
2015] 875
VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW [VOL. 48:813
One way around this particular problem is to rely on Cass
Sunstein's notion of incompletely theorized agreements.3 79 Sunstein's
proposition is relatively simple and is based on the notion that
"people can often agree on constitutional practices, and even on
rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional theories."3 80 His
method allows people to agree on "both abstract principles and
particular outcomes without resolving large-scale issues of the right
or the good."3 81
While Sunstein's approach reflects a number of pragmatic
benefits, extensive use of incompletely theorized agreements could be
particularly dangerous in cases involving religious rights, since
"[r]eligion is a matter on which people, judges included, tend to have
gut feelings that often look inarticulate but nevertheless can
powerfully affect their outlooks."38 2 Therefore, "[c]ase by case,
intuitive judgments about such matters are likely to be unacceptably
subjective . . . [and] give too little attention to the position of religious
minorities."38 3 Furthermore, it is often necessary in this field to at
least attempt to identify some overarching principles to avoid
problems of arbitrariness. 384
Hobby Lobby's departure from existing principles and precedent
in the area of religious liberty could be considered to constitute a type
of incompletely theorized agreement.3 85 However, the majority
opinion has not generated a universally acceptable constitutional
practice or approach to religious rights, as required under Sunstein's
proposal. 386 Indeed, the majority's approach appears likely to
generate a great deal of future litigation.38 7 Therefore, the majority
approach cannot be justified as a pragmatic solution to the problem at
hand.
G. Interim Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggests that the majority decision in
Hobby Lobby cannot be justified on any of the grounds commonly
379. See Sunstein, Agreements, supra note 277, at 117 (discussing incompletely
theorized agreements).
380. See id. (emphasis omitted).
381. See id. at 121.
382. See Berg, supra note 137, at 701.
383. Id. (citations omitted).
384. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964) (noting need to
avoid arbitrary laws); see also Berg, supra note 137, at 694, 703 (writing in the context
of U.S. constitutional law).
385. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2794-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting the majority decision was an anomaly in several regards).
386. See Sunstein, Agreements, supra note 277, at 117, 121 (discussing
incompletely theorized agreements).
387. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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used to rationalize religious rights.38 8 Although the best argument
involves the claim that the majority was attempting to minimize
alienation by its grant of a religious accommodation in this case,
closer examination suggests a lack of fit between the type of activity
at issue in Hobby Lobby and the purpose of the alienation
rationale.38 9 As a result, the majority's decision to provide commercial
corporations with this sort of religious accommodation does not
appear to be a warranted extension of existing law.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the
dissenting opinion is relatively closely aligned with several
acknowledged principles of religious liberty, particularly those
relating to personal autonomy, self-definition, and the search for
truth.390 As the preceding discussion shows, there are times when the
rationales supporting religious liberty can be used to deny a request
for a religious accommodation.
This section has considered the various rationales used to justify
religious liberties in an effort to determine whether the majority
opinion in Hobby Lobby could be considered a legitimate extension of
existing religious rights.39 1 The conclusion in this case is that Hobby
Lobby was unwarranted.3 9 2 However, there are those who might need
further persuasion. Therefore, the following section will consider
various theoretical justifications supporting the limitation of religious
rights. If any of these rationales can be said to apply to the situation
in Hobby Lobby, then that would provide additional support for the
conclusion that the majority in Hobby Lobby exceeded the proper
bounds of religious liberty.39 3
V. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS LIMITING RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
Although religious liberty is considered fundamental in many
legal systems, a number of theorists have proposed that such rights
should be limited rather than expanded. Numerous rationales have
been advanced in support of this proposition, including the claims
that religious rights violate the principle of neutrality, benefit
religious beliefs over other ethical beliefs, allow religious persons to
become a law unto themselves, and encourage improper scrutiny of
religious beliefs. Each of these perspectives will be considered
separately and in light of Hobby Lobby to determine whether the
388. See id. at 2759-85.
389. See id.; see also supra notes 311-17 and accompanying text.
390. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787-2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
391. See id. at 2759.
392. But see id.
393. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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majority should have adopted a more restrained approach to religious
rights. 3 94
A. Religious Rights Violate the Principle of Neutrality
One of the most well-known criticisms of religious rights holds
that accommodations for religious believers "violates the principle of
neutrality toward religion."3 95 Although much of the commentary
advocating neutrality arises within the context of U.S. constitutional
law, which requires state neutrality toward religion, 396 support for
the principle of neutrality can also be justified on other grounds. For
example, Michael Sandel favors a neutral approach towards religious
practices and belief on an instrumental basis, claiming that
neutrality helps foster religion, avoid civil strife, and support
individual freedom.3 97
Not everyone agrees that concerns about neutrality should lead
to the limitation of religious rights. For example, Michael McConnell
believes that criticisms based on neutrality rest on "the false claim
that all accommodations are an affirmative inducement or subsidy for
religion."3 98 He notes, with others, that although religious
accommodations may violate formal neutrality (which holds that
states should base policy decisions on purely secular grounds), they
do not violate substantive neutrality.3 99
Theorists like McConnell elevate substantive neutrality over
formal neutrality because the latter only addresses persecution of or
overt discrimination against religion and therefore does not provide
adequate protection for religious beliefs and practices. 40 0 At best,
formal neutrality requires "mandatory indifference to the impact of
394. See generally id.
395. West, supra note 271, at 600; see also McConnell, Accommodation, supra
note 109, at 727 (discussing neutrality in religious rights jurisprudence). The principle
has also been framed as violating the principle of neutrality between religious and
nonreligious persons. See Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 34 (discussing
Irish case law). Indeed, some commentators see courts as more inclined to protect the
freedom to religion than the freedom from religion. See id. at 41 (discussing the
jurisprudence of the Irish Supreme Court).
396. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (forbidding the state to "pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another").
397. See Sandel, Freedom of Conscience, supra note 270, at 84-85.
398. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 727.
399. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1003 (1989-1990) [hereinafter Laycock,
Neutrality] (discussing various types of neutrality); McConnell, Accommodation, supra
note 109, at 689, 691-92, 729 (considering neutrality in context of religious rights
jurisprudence); Sapir, supra note 341, at 588-90 (analyzing neutrality from a
theoretical perspective).
400. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 691 (differentiating
between types of neutrality).
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government action on the religious lives of the people," while at worst
it "leaves protection of religious freedom to legislative grace." 401
Substantive neutrality, on the other hand, "minimizes government's
influence on the religious choices of citizens," 402 and acts to "lift
burdens on minorities." 403 Therefore, these commentators have
concluded that protecting substantive neutrality furthers religious
persons' interests more than formal neutrality does. 404
Religious people also have concerns about neutrality and often
perceive a number of existing laws as being "anti-religious."40 5 This
position is based on the belief that the term "neutrality" masks
substantive liberal values, which are alien to these persons' religious
beliefs. 406 The claim in this case is that no system of justice is truly
neutral: instead, all are based on some underlying value such as
fairness or equality.40 7
Michael Sandel would agree with this formulation, for he
recognizes that issues such as abortion
cannot be neutral with respect to . .. moral and religious controversy.
[They] must engage rather than avoid the comprehensive moral and
religious doctrines at stake. Liberals often resist this engagement
because it violates the priority of the right over the good. But the
abortion debate shows that this priority cannot be sustained.4 0 8
In fact, trying to avoid decisions regarding competing conceptions of
the good is often pointless, since there are many equally compelling
yet competing conceptions of rights.4 09
John Rawls has said that "that the term neutrality is
unfortunate[, because] some of its connotations are highly misleading,
401. Id. at 693; see also Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 399, at 999-1011
(discussing types of neutrality).
402. Berg, supra note 137, at 732.
403. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 59 (1996).
404. See Berg, supra note 137, at 732 (discussing effect of religious neutrality);
Greene, supra note 403, at 59 (distinguishing between types of neutrality); McConnell,
Accommodation, supra note 109, at 691 (analyzing ramifications of different
approaches to neutrality).
405. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25 (1984).
406. See Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!":
Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 163 (1993) (parsing
concept of neutrality); Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
305, 313-29 (1990) (analyzing neutrality in religious realm).
407. See, e.g., RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 368, at 11 (advocating
"justice as fairness," where equality acts as the dominant value).
408. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1778
(1994).
409. See Smith, supra note 406, at 315-16 (discussing various approaches to
religious rights); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 203-04 (1998) (noting impossibility of "bracketing" justice).
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[while] others suggest altogether impracticable principles."4 10 Thus,
the concept of neutrality can be defined as reflecting everything from
an intentional indifference to or intentional non-interference with
religion on the one hand to intentional egalitarianism or de facto
establishmentarianism on the other.411
This debate suggests that "neutrality" is an inherently empty
concept and cannot be used to limit religious rights. All choices
violate strict neutrality in some respect, just as all theories of
religious freedom adopt some perspective (be it religious or secular) at
the expense of other perspectives. 412 The only possible conclusion is
that while it is possible to minimize the effect a policy has on other
viewpoints, it is impossible to eliminate that effect altogether. 413
Since neutrality cannot be used to limit religious rights, it cannot
be used to justify either the majority or the dissent in Hobby
Lobby.4 14 Furthermore, none of the justices appear to have raised the
issue, so it does not appear to have been considered as a possible
justification for any of the opinions in the case.415
B. Religious Rights Benefit Religious Beliefs
Over Other Ethical Beliefs
Another major reason for limiting religious rights is based on the
idea that states should not privilege religion over other ethical or
moral codes because religious beliefs are not the only beliefs that are
(1) strongly held and (2) integral to a person's identity.416 For
example, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager would give
equal regard to all "deep concerns," whether those concerns are
religious in nature or not.4 17
410. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 283, at 1996; see also L. Scott
Smith, "Religion-Neutral" Jurisprudence: An Examination of its Meanings and End, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 841, 842 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Religion-Neutral]
(analyzing concept of religious neutrality).
411. See Smith, Religion-Neutral, supra note 410, at 846-95 (discussing various
types of religious neutrality).
412. See SMITH, supra note 137, at 63, 67-68 (concluding the concept of
neutrality does not exist).
413. See Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 399, at 1004-07 (advocating the use of
a balancing test to weigh the relative impact of different policies).
414. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
415. See id. The dissent did discuss the principle of nondiscrimination, although
that concept is not precisely the same as neutrality. See id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
416. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 304, at 1253 n.22, 1255 (discussing
rationales for religious liberty); William P. Marshall, In Defence of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320-21 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall,
Defence] (discussing various types of religious, moral, and ethical codes); McConnell,
Accommodation, supra note 109, at 727 (considering justifications for religious
accommodations).
417. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 304, at 1283.
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The question therefore arises as to why it is appropriate to prefer
one type of belief (religious belief) over other belief systems.41 8 In
considering this issue, critics focus not only on theoretical issues but
also on the practical difficulties associated with distinguishing a
religious claim from a merely ethical claim.4 19 Another potential
problem involves the likelihood that focusing on religion per se
primarily benefits organized faiths while ignoring more
individualized belief systems. 420
One of the standard explanations for benefitting religious beliefs
over other ethical beliefs is that violation of religious belief and
practices can result in increased violence.42 ' This conclusion is also
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, which held that
[tihe essential characteristic of ... [religious] liberties is, that under
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary
than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of
many creeds. There are limits to the exercise of these liberties. The
danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the
delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches
of the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the
exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These
and other transgressions of those limits the States appropriately may
punish.4 2 2
Another common claim reason for benefitting religious beliefs
over other types of beliefs is that violations of religious beliefs can
result in long-lasting spiritual harm.4 23 This phenomenon suggests
that choices between different ethical beliefs can be legitimately
made at the political level, whereas the inability and impropriety of
choosing between different versions of religious truth require states
to give religious beliefs special protection. 424
Inquiries regarding the potential for enduring harm to a person's
spiritual status are of course difficult to carry out, both practically
and philosophically, since they include both a subjective element (i.e.,
what do these particular plaintiffs believe and how strongly do they
418. See West, supra note 271, at 598-99 (weighing different belief systems).
419. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 957-60 (comparing
religious and other types of beliefs).
420. See Daly, Irish Constitution, supra note 161, at 31 (considering organized
religion versus individualized belief systems).
421. See supra notes 281-300 and accompanying text. Concerns about religious
violence have been discussed previously and have been found inapplicable in the
context of the Hobby Lobby dispute. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
422. See Cantwell, supra note 209, at 310.
423. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
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believe it) as well as an objective element (i.e., how central is this
belief or practice to the tenets of the faith tradition in question).425
In Hobby Lobby, the majority took the view that some sort of
negative effect on enduring spiritual matters existed, based on the
facial allegations of the shareholders of the plaintiff corporations. 426
The dissent, on the other hand, believed that the use of the corporate
form as well as the indirect and speculative nature of the decision to
use the contraceptives in question made the legal and, perhaps,
religious effect too attenuated to merit the relief requested. 427
Despite these brief allusions to the nature of the religious act,
both the majority and the dissent sought to avoid any direct inquiries
into the impact of this particular religious claim on a believer's
spiritual status.428 This type of deferential approach appears highly
appropriate in situations where the activity in question constitutes a
recognized religious practice. 429 However, those who have expressed
concern about elevating religious beliefs over other sorts of ethical
beliefs may find blanket deference problematic in situations where
the religious act falls outside the standard list of religious practices,
since those activities may seem more akin to the kinds of ethical
activities that are not given special protection under the law than to
the kinds of religious activities that are granted legal
accommodations.
The preceding suggests that both the majority and the dissent in
Hobby Lobby recognized the practical and jurisprudential difficulties
associated with distinguishing between ethical and moral beliefs,
although both opinions also recognized that the United States had
long ago made a policy decision to give religious beliefs and practices
special status in the law.430 As a result, neither the majority nor the
dissent can be said to be better than the other when it comes to this
425. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 239, at 1917 (considering eternal effects of
religious acts); Priscilla J. Smith, Who Decides Conscience? RFRA'S Catch-22, 22 J.L. &
POLY 727, 728-29 (2014) [hererinafter Smith, Catch-22] (discussing types of religious
harms); see also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 890 (1990), superseded by
statute, as recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751. The majority held that RFRA,
as amended by the RLUIPA, does not include a centrality test, although commentators
have suggested that centrality is a necessary part of the analysis. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-1-4; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1-5; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762, 2778; see
also Smith, Catch-22, supra, at 728-29 (discussing centrality under RFRA); Steven C.
Seeger, Note, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 1474-75 (1997) (considering
centrality concerns under RFRA).
426. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
427. See id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
428. See id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Smith, Catch-22, supra note 425,
at 728-29.
429. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
430. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
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particular issue. Therefore, it is necessary to look elsewhere to
evaluate the propriety of the decision in Hobby Lobby.431
C. Religious Rights Allow Religious Persons to Become a
Law Unto Themselves
The third theoretical objection to religious rights holds that
granting religious accommodations can allow the faithful to become a
law unto themselves. 432 Numerous commentators, including
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, have noted that if
religious beliefs and practices are given full sway, "the faithful would
be licensed to do as their faith require[d], with little regard for the
consequences as seen from the vantage of secular society."48 8 Chaos
would ensue, since "the demands of one faith would ultimately extend
so far as to come into sharp conflict with the requirements of other
religions, and some mechanism, presumably secular, would have to
arbitrate."43 4 As a result, some limits are necessary.48 5
The difference in attitude between those who support religious
rights and those who oppose them may stem from a difference in
perspective. For example, persons who seek to limit the availability or
scope of religious liberties typically view religious claims as
attempting to "expand [religious persons'] sphere of influence or
power." 43 6 Persons who provide broad support for religious liberties
characterize religious claims as defensive in nature and view
religiously devout persons as attempting to staunch what is seen "as
a disastrous erosion of their status and control"437 by resisting "laws
that restrict their own religious observance." 43 8 This dichotomy
appears to exist in Hobby Lobby, with the majority adopting the
latter perspective and the dissent embracing the former. 439
431. See id.
432. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), superseded by
statute, as recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 162-63 (1878); Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-
Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 593 (2000) (considering religious harms to others).
433. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 304, at 1257.
434. Id.
435. See id. at 1258-60 (discussing the need to limit religious rights).
436. Ehud Sprinzak, Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish
Fundamentalism in Israel, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITIES,
ECONOMIES, AND MILITANCE, supra note 287, at 462, 466; see also John H. Garvey,
Fundamentalism and American Law, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE:
REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES, AND MILITANCE, supra note 287, at 28, 41
[hereinafter Garvey, Fundamentalism] (discussing limits on religious liberty).
437. Sprinzak, supra note 436, at 466.
438. Garvey, Fundamentalism, supra note 436, at 39, 41; see also MATTHEW C.
MOEN, THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND CONGRESS 90 (1989) (discussing scope of
contemporary religious claims).
439. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
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Expansive claims of religious liberty are often seen as
problematic to the extent such assertions blur the distinction between
public and private concerns and infringe on non-believers' religious
and other rights.440 However, defensive claims of religious liberty are
typically seen as consistent with various religiously oriented goals
such as self-definition and personal autonomy. 441 John Rawls, who
supports liberty of conscience but defines it restrictively, classifies
demands for religious rights as self-interested attempts to achieve
special governmental favor for persons of one particular religious
"persuasion."442  However, to the extent that a religious
accommodation for one faith can and should be applied equally to
other faiths, Rawls's objection is not apt.443
As a result, opponents to religious rights often perceive religious
people as seeking inappropriate and/or unnecessary benefits that are
denied to others. Part of this hostility to religious rights may stem
from a belief that religion does not merit special treatment,
particularly in comparison to other ethical beliefs. 444 Alternatively,
there may be concerns that the request for religious accommodation
is fabricated simply as a means of avoiding a law that is politically
unpopular for other reasons.
This latter possibility certainly seems relevant in Hobby Lobby,
given the highly politicized debate over the PPACA. 445 The situation
is further exacerbated in this particular case because the activities in
question do not fall into the recognized list of standard religious
practices and because the religious injury is extremely attenuated,
both structurally (because of the use of the corporate form) and
factually (because of the intervening decisions of the employee and
her doctor).44 6 Concerns about religious persons becoming a law unto
themselves are also evident in the dissent's discussion about the
440. See MOEN, supra note 438, at 90 (discussing problems with contemporary
religious claims); Garvey, Fundamentalism, supra note 436, at 41 (analyzing nature of
recent demands for religious accommodation).
441. See MOEN, supra note 438, at 90 (discussing problems with contemporary
religious claims); Garvey, Fundamentalism, supra note 436, at 41 (analyzing nature of
recent demands for religious accommodation).
442. RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 283, at 24. In fact,
accommodation may be more accurately described as a means of safeguarding religious
rituals and distinctive religious practices that would be protected as a matter of course
in a society where the believers' faith constituted the majority, rather than minority,
religious tradition.
443. See id. (citing problems with religious accommodations).
444. See supra notes 416-31 and accompanying text.
445. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2010); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2759; Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation:
Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and
the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2013) (discussing the "political maelstrom"
regarding the PPACA).
446. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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number of future cases and the need to establish and retain a
comprehensive national policy regarding health insurance. 447
Although the majority attempts to assuage concerns about the
breadth of its decision by claiming that its holding is limited to the
facts of the case, the dissent addresses issues relating to every
religious person's becoming a law unto his or herself much more
comprehensively and realistically than the majority. 448 In fact,
Justice Ginsburg appeared to be somewhat prophetic, given that the
Court relied on Hobby Lobby only days after it was issued to grant an
extremely rare emergency injunction to a liberal arts college.449 As a
result of these factors, the dissent in Hobby Lobby appears to have
the better argument on this particular issue.450 Thus, it could be said
that the majority has gone too far in granting this particular
accommodation. 451
D. Religious Rights Result in Improper Scrutiny of Religious Beliefs
Another factor used to justify the limitation of religious rights
involves fears about the state becoming improperly involved in the
scrutiny of religious beliefs. This impropriety may occur in several
ways.452
First, courts might have to evaluate the sincerity of a religious
believer's request for accommodation in order to weed out
unscrupulous people who feign religious belief to gain the benefits
granted to religious believers. 453 Michael McConnell rebuts that
concern by noting that, "[b]ecause accommodations are designed to
alleviate a burden, not to bestow a benefit, the incentives to feign
religious belief are reduced - and it is precisely the cases in which the
incentives are strong that the government is most likely to be able to
447. See id. at 2802-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
448. See id. at 2782-83; id. at 2802-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
449. See id. at 2751; see also Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807
(2014).
450. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787-806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
451. Interestingly, several members of the majority have cited this precise
concern and the need to trust to the political process in other cases where they have
ruled against a religious accommodation. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Kennedy, among others who
are no longer on the Court).
452. See Marshall, Defence, supra note 416, at 310-11 (discussing improper
scrutiny of religious beliefs); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 735
(noting need to scrutinize religious beliefs in accommodation cases).
453. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); EVANS, supra
note 201, at 58 (discussing sincerity in religious rights analyses); West, supra note 271,
at 603 (considering sincerity issues). Some commentators view sincerity as an
appropriate factor in a test for religious rights. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra
note 90, at 953-57 (supporting sincerity requirements).
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establish a compelling interest in not having to make
accommodations." 454
Second, courts and commentators worry that religious
accommodations will require the state to inquire into the content of a
person's religious beliefs. 455 Not only would such inquiries foster
increased state involvement in matters of conscience (an undesired
end, to the extent that one believes that separation of church and
state protects both religion and the state),45 6 they would also force
courts and legislatures to decide what constituted a religious claim
under different faith traditions. For example, Ira Lupu believes that
if the state takes the view that "government-created burdens on more
central aspects of a religion constitute greater intrusions, and
therefore require a higher degree of justification, than burdens on
more peripheral features," then the court will be faced with the
"spectre of religious experts giving conflicting testimony about the
significance of a religious practice, with the state's decisionmaker
authoritatively choosing among them."4 57
Although most states have managed to avoid these problems
through restricted definitions of religion, requiring the state to decide
what a proper religious accommodation is, based on an independent
evaluation of the content of religious beliefs, carries a high potential
for discrimination, particularly in cases involving new or disfavored
religions. 458 Furthermore, some people may be in favor of a particular
religious accommodation when it benefits their belief system but not
when the same protection is extended to religious traditions that are
viewed with suspicion.45 9
None of the justices in Hobby Lobby looked into the sincerity or
the content of beliefs held by the shareholders of the plaintiff
454. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 109, at 735. Opinions may vary
as to whether a particular accommodation provides a benefit or lifts a burden. See
supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
455. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 958-59 (noting need for
content-based inquiries).
456. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 137, passim
(discussing James Madison's views in particular); Michael W. McConnell, Religion and
Its Relation to Limited Government, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 943, 952 (2010)
(discussing connections between religion and government). James Madison wrote that
separation of church and state led to the protection of religion as much as of the state.
See Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion - A New Hypothesis, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 137, at 175, 189 (discussing James
Madison); van der Vyver, supra note 133, at xxv (noting views of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson).
457. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 958-59; see also Clark,
supra note 273, at 361-62 (discussing problems of competing religious interpretations).
458. See Bradney, Faced by Faith, supra note 102, at 92-103 (discussing court
scrutiny of minority religious practices); see also supra notes 30-115 and accompanying
text.
459. Thus, some people may favor granting a religious objection to a corporate
entity that is said to hold Christian beliefs while wishing to deny the same
accommodation to a corporation espousing Islamic beliefs.
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corporations, so this issue did not arise in this particular dispute.460
However, it would appear that content-based inquiries become
increasingly tempting the farther one moves away from conventional
religious practices (i.e., teaching, worship, organization, etc.). This
phenomenon is particularly true in legal systems that give
precedence to religious motivation in the religious rights
determination, since it may be considered necessary to evaluate the
content of the religion in question in order to distinguish between
religious motivations and political or ethical motivations.461
Although the majority in Hobby Lobby accused the dissent of
veering dangerously close to this sort of suspect inquiry, the majority
also appears to run the risk of impropriety as a result of its emphasis
on the importance of religious motivation to the near exclusion of any
other factor. 462 Although all of the justices agreed that it is both
unseemly and inappropriate for a court to evaluate the content of
religious beliefs and practices, the dissent appears to have taken the
better approach by balancing religious motivation with the effect of
the accommodation on other persons or society.46 3
VI. CONCLUSION
In the months preceding and following its hearing at the U.S.
Supreme Court, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. has generated a
great deal of controversy in both the legal and lay communities.46 4
Not only does the dispute involve a number of novel questions that
are extremely interesting to lawyers qua lawyers, it also addresses
various concerns that affect individuals and society at a deep and
fundamental level. 465 As a result, it is unsurprising that the case
generated a sharp division among the members of the Supreme
Court.
The difficulty with cases such as these is that there is often
insufficient common ground to allow objective analysis of the
competing viewpoints. However, disputes involving religious liberties
may in some ways be more susceptible to independent analysis
simply because these issues have been discussed and debated for
460. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775; id. at 2805-06 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
461. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
462. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778; see also id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
463. See id. at 2778; see also id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Jared
A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 502-03, 538-40 (2005)
(arguing that the type of inquiries courts make are largely appropriate).
464. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
465. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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centuries. As a result, there is a great deal of historical, theoretical,
and comparative data concerning the accommodation of religious
beliefs and practices in civil society.
While many of the theories relating to religious rights can at
times appear contradictory, several are also mutually reinforcing.
Thus, issues relating to alienation and the furtherance of personal
autonomy, self-definition, and the search for religious truth often
relate back to problems associated with keeping the civil order.
However, observers should not conclude that religious liberty can be
reduced to a single concern about civil order, since such an approach
would rob the debate about religious rights of its depth and
complexity. Instead, these so-called subordinate principles should be
viewed as providing independent support for religious liberty as well
as describing more particular means of furthering the ultimate goal of
preserving the peace.
This Article has considered the propriety of Hobby Lobby from a
variety of perspectives so as to determine whether the majority
opinion can be considered an appropriate exercise of judicial power.
Parts II and II of this Article focused on the history of religious rights
and identified the various international and comparative standards
that apply in this area of law. That analysis demonstrated that the
grant of a religious accommodation to a commercial corporation
seeking to avoid the provision of health insurance coverage for certain
types of contraception exceeds the bounds of religious liberty, as
recognized historically and under national and international law. As
a result, the decision in Hobby Lobby can be considered
presumptively improper.4 66
However, this Article also recognized that there are times when
the existing law can be legitimately extended to cover novel
situations. In cases where the facts outpace the law, it is necessary to
return to first principles and consider the theoretical justifications for
particular laws and policies so as to determine whether the decision
in question is consistent with the purposes and goals of religious
liberty. Therefore, this Article continued its analysis of Hobby Lobby
by considering these types of theoretical issues in Parts IV and V to
see whether the majority decision could be justified by reference to
one of these rationales. 467 Although this inquiry was difficult, given
the complexity of the jurisprudence in this field, ultimately this
Article concluded that the majority decision in Hobby Lobby could not
be justified on theoretical grounds. 468
Religious liberty is an extremely complicated and thought-
provoking area of law. Lines are finely drawn, and debate often
ensues about whether a court or legislature acted properly. Numerous
466. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
467. See supra Parts IV-V.
468. See supra Part TV.
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commentators will doubtless debate the propriety of Hobby Lobby
from a statutory, constitutional, and political perspective in the
coming years.46 9 Other issues may also be discussed, such as the
extent to which the Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that
the religious claim was based on a particular interpretation of
Christianity, which is typically considered to be the majority religion
in the United States. 470 There are numerous examples where a
minority religion has not fared as well at the hands of U.S. courts and
legislatures, 4 71 and it is unclear whether the majority in Hobby Lobby
would have adopted the same approach had the commercial
corporation in question had espoused Islamic, Native American, or
Santerian values.472
As this Article has shown, the need to "distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the
just bounds that lie between the one and the other" did not end with
Locke. 473 Instead, courts and legislatures must constantly reassess
the delicate balance between the needs of religious individuals and
the needs of contemporary society. Sometimes, as in Hobby Lobby, the
request for religious accommodation exceeds the scope of existing law
and theory.4 74 However, such cases are nevertheless vital to the
proper functioning of our legal system, since they reinforce the need
to understand the role that religious liberty plays in the United
States as a matter of history and theory.
469. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
470. See id. at 2765-66.
471. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
472. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, as recognized
in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751; see also NUSSBAUM, INTOLERANCE, supra note 118,
at 104-05 (discussing contemporary views of minority faiths in the United States);
supra notes 119, 180-86 and accompanying text (regarding anti-Shari'a legislation and
regarding Islamic dress in court). A number of minority faiths combine commercial and
religious elements in a way that may seem unusual to those who are more familiar
with the Christian faith. See Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor's Soul:
Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 157, 157-59 (2011)
(discussing Jewish and Islamic practices); Simon Hooper, UK Aims to Become Centre
for Islamic Finance, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2013/10/uk-aims-become-centre-islamic-finance-201310319840639385.html
[http://perma.cc/S93U-SUZD] (archived Feb. 25, 2015) (discussing Islamic practices).
Interestingly, several members of the majority highlighted the need to trust to the
political process in another case involving a request from a religious minority for a
religious accommodation, using language that could have applied with equal vigor to
the dispute in Hobby Lobby. See Smith, supra, at 809; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2759.
473. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 18.
474. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
8892015]

